

Henrik Wiig

# **Land and women empowerment – Methodology and summary report of the PeruLandGender household survey**

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Abstract: Joint land titling in Peru implied a defacto transfer of property from men to women. This project conducted a survey of 1280 household to measure the impact on women participation in household decision making. The following report describes the methodological approach and summarizes the main results which indicate a positive effect on women empowerment.

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# Preface

The Purpose of this study is to explore the effects of joint titling of land for the women within the household. The extraordinary comprehensive process in Peru distinguished households to be titled and not titled in an exogenous process independent of household characteristics. The PeruLandGender research project in NIBR hence collected a cross section household survey in 2010 to measure the impact of the process. This report hence describes the methodology applied and summarizes the main results. Further results and background on the project home pages <http://perulandgender.nibrinternational.no>.

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Oslo, April 2012

Marit Haug  
Research director

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# Summary

*Henrik Wiig*

## **Land and women empowerment – Methodology and summary report of the PeruLandGender household survey**

NIBR Working Paper 2012:102

Peru titled 1.5 million parcels in less than a decade imposing joint titles between man and husband in 57 percent of the cases. This gender equalising policy implies a transfer of land (capital) from men to women which according to bargaining theory should empower women. The PeruLandGender study is designed to measure the impact on women participation in household decision making through experiments, qualitative and quantitative studies. This article is a summary and methodological report of the 1280 households surveyed in 69 Peruvian highland communities. We interview man and women of the principal couple separately and jointly to construct indicators that reflect participation in decisions of the household. Exploiting a historic coincidence due to the land reform 40 years ago which removes potential endogeneity bias, I find that women in communities where each parcel is titled, i.e. mostly jointly between man and woman, take significantly more in household decision making than the women in communities where no individual titling has taken place

In norwegian: Peru utstedet 1.5 millioner skjøter på landbruksjord i løpet av et tiår med felles eiendomsrett mellom mann og kvinne i husholdet i 57 prosent av tilfellene. Denne likestillingspolitikken impliserer en overføring av jord (kapital) fra men til kvinner som i følge forhandlingsteori skal tilsi en styrking av kvinnens posisjon. PeruLandGender studien er designet for å måle innvirkningen på kvinners deltagelse i husholdsbeslutninger ved hjelp av eksperimenter, kvalitativ og kvantitative undersøkelser. The artikkelen beskriver metode og oppsummerer hovedresultatene i spørreundersøkelse av 1280 husstander i 69 landsbyer (communities). Vi intervjuet man og kvinne i husstandens viktigste par individuelt og sammen for å lage en indikator som reflekterer deltagelse i husholdets beslutninger. Ved å utnytte en historisk tilfeldighet som fjerner eventuelle endogenitetsproblemer med opphav i land reformen for 40 år siden, finner jeg at kvinner i landsbyer med skjøte på hvert enkelt jordstykke, dvs. hovedsakelig felleseie mellom mann og kvinne, deltar signifikant mer i husholdsbeslutninger enn kvinner i landsbyer hvor registrering av eiendomsrett til jordstykker ikke har funnet sted.

# 1 Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Gender equality has become an integral part of policies in poor developing countries. The perspective of women's rights as a human right not to be refuted by culture or political majority decision-making is rather new. In addition to being an aim in itself, gender equality seems to increase economic productivity by changing household resource allocation. A growing amount of empirical literature on gender shows that there is more development and improved wellbeing in households with influential women (Godoy et al. 2006). National and international policies in developing countries have hence started to explicitly favour women, e.g. family support cash transfer programs are paid directly to women, additional investments in female schooling and women are explicitly prioritized in public policies. Female priority in new government policies are not necessarily directly at the cost of men since the policies represent new funds, e.g. cash transfer. More radical redistribution, however, might be introduced through new laws that have a different purpose.

One such example is the formalization of property rights in Peru which defacto has led to a redistribution of land from men to women. Deere and León (2001) calculate that only 13 percent of the parcels in the Peruvian Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) had joint titles in 2000, while 78 percent was reported to be owned by the man alone. We found a considerably higher share of 43 percent jointly owned in the GRADE data set collected four years later in an evaluation of the titling program, while the figure rose to 55 percent in households with a couple present (Fuentes & Wigg 2009). Gender NGOs argue for joint property rights to obtain a more positive response from normally less feminist-friendly elements of Peruvian society. Actors like the Catholic church accepted that joint property rights would actually tie the family together and would hence represent a conservative institution compared to individual titling (Deere & León 2001). They would then accept a defacto transfer of property from men to women. However, few land market transactions in general indicate that most parcels are inherited and should hence have been individually titled by either the woman or man alone. There is hence a contradiction between the land titling law and the civil code.

The fundamental assumption in bargaining theory is that women with assets of their own will achieve a better living standard in cases of marriage breakdown compared

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<sup>1</sup> Author's e-mail [henrik.wigg@nibr.no](mailto:henrik.wigg@nibr.no). Thanks to Lene Sandvik for impeccable research assistance on the tables and comments from Daniela Orge-Fuentes, Carmen Diana Deere and Henrique Mayer. I thank Carolina Trivelli at the Institute for Peruvian Studies for her hospitality and valuable input to the formulation of the questionnaires; Oscar Madalengoitia, Lucy Sandoval Pareja, Lene Sandvik and Victoria Mamani Quispe for excellent supervision of data collection and Instituto Cuanto for the data collection itself. The research is financed by the Research Council of Norway Latin America program grant no. 196328.



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to a woman without assets. An increased sense of security makes women less dependent on their husbands, which reduces risk of demanding influence over household decisions. This changes the threat point in a bargaining model and the resulting Nash equilibrium in her favour according to Manser and Brown (1980). Furthermore, rents from her asset will be part of total household income. Social norms in general indicate that people who contribute more to the common good also have a greater right to decide over its consumption.

Women are perceived as the weaker sex in Peruvian society, but there are few studies according to our knowledge that actually try to measure women empowerment and land ownership. Participation in positively-realized household decisions is our main empowerment indicator rather than restrictions on making such decisions at all, e.g. due to low income. In other words, the outcome is our main empowerment indicator.

In this report we describe fundamental statistics on land property and decision indicators from our PeruLandGender household questionnaire, with responses from the principal couples of both joint and individual modules in 1,280 highland households. Analysis on causal mechanisms will be done in adjacent articles.

The household survey constitutes the most important component of the PeruLandGender research project. In addition, we conducted qualitative household interviews and experiments. Both experiments and qualitative interviews indicated that absolute household wealth has a positive effect for women (Wiig et al. 2011). Three different reasons are given: (i) Land inheritance and/or inter-vivo transfers are actually perceived as transfers of land from the parents of one of the spouses to the couple as unit, (ii) compensation if the husband is to blame for the marriage breakup, and/or (iii) women keep land in custody for their children if they become the main post-marriage provider.

## 2 Background and literature

### 2.1 Background

To our knowledge, there are few studies that empirically investigate the assumed empowerment effect of asset ownership that lies at the heart of gender sensitive policies. The most common empowerment indicators are outcomes, which are thought to reflect differences in preferences between women and men. The outcome variables that are typically used include: health, education, spending on children, labour participation, etc. Positive changes in these outcomes are thought to reflect increased intra-household bargaining-power for the woman. Another strand of the empirical literature simply records the respondent's perception of women's influence on household decision-making. We make a different approach by recording women participation in explicit household decisions.

### 2.2 Women in Peru

Women in Peruvian rural communities are in general thought to have a weak position. Men control the public spaces such as community assemblies and irrigation boards, excluding women from assemblies and reserving leadership positions to themselves. However, little is known about what actually goes on inside the rural household and about how power is divided between the different household members and what determines the level of influence each household member has.

Intra-household violence and male alcohol abuse is common in rural Peru. This is often taken as a sign of a weak female position within the household. Other household characteristics, however, indicate a rather strong position. Women often control the household economy in line with other poor households around the world. Women often take the role of household accountant, both keeping the money physically and making sure that expenditures are held within household budget constraints. Even men support the idea that women are more capable in managing the household economy<sup>2</sup>. Accounting, however, does not necessarily imply the right to decide how pooled funds are spent. She might simply be a "subordinate" effectuating the orders of her husband. However, asymmetric information and physical control empowers the woman, as she knows more about available funds and household needs. Furthermore, she can implicitly resist "orders" by delaying the

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<sup>2</sup> Sixty-eight percent of the household finances are managed by the woman, 6 percent by the man and 25 percent by both, according to the women themselves in a separate individual section of our household survey. The response by men differs only slightly.

execution, e.g. “dragging her feet”. More importantly, knowing more about household needs and possibilities than her husband makes it easier to argue for solutions that are to her preference. In our qualitative interviews we find that women tend to control smaller purchases and the sales of products, while men decide over more valuable transactions and investments. We find that men decide in agriculture and have more influence on investments such as the purchase of land.

A fundamental argument on gender equality in the Peruvian countryside is whether discrimination of women is a traditional or a new phenomenon. Collins (1986) claims there is a rather egalitarian division of labour in rural areas of southern Peru where subsistence agriculture is still common. Both the woman and man will depend upon the other and all tasks are thought to be equally valuable for the survival of the household. Within a market economy, however, male labour is more highly valued and this perception of the relative value of the sexes is absorbed as norms within a household. The man is expected to make more decisions simply because he earns and contributes more to the household, something which Sen (1990) denominates as the norm of “perceived contribution response”. Deere (2008) on the other hand, claims that increased market integration in Peru has principally led to male labour migration, and women have increasingly taken more responsibility over the family and daily household decisions. This has led to the feminization of agriculture in Latin America. Deere and Contreras Diaz (2011) find that the share of assets that belong to women falls from 60 percent for the poorest quintile to 50 percent in the richest in Ecuador, while their companion study from India indicates a drastic reduction from 62 to 17 percent for the same quintiles. Our survey discloses a significant negative correlation between women empowerment indicators and the household income level.

## 2.3 Literature

“Empowerment”, or even “power”, is hard to relate unambiguously to empirical material outcomes and actions taken. The term reflects the ability to decide over your own as well as others’ destiny. It also relates to the amount of possibilities you achieve or are given, and your ability to convert these possibilities into your preferred outcomes. According to Kabeer (1999) the concept of empowerment is defined by three interrelated aspects: resources to make a choice, the agency to influence the choice and furthermore that the outcome is beneficiary to the person<sup>3</sup>. Sen (2000) applies the concept of “capabilities” for the two first elements as the set of possibilities open to a given individual, but stresses that the outcome differs according to a person’s preferences. A typical example would be the rich ascetic who feels no personal utility of material consumption<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Women might self-inflict choices that are not objectively in her interest due to cultural expectations and social rewards, e.g. genital circumcision.

<sup>4</sup> In the “post-material” state of the current western world the feeling of unwanted abundance has also entered the middle classes, leading people to save for some undefined need in the future rather than consumption today. They prefer not to consume even though they have the “power” to buy whatever they want. However, this point is less relevant in the Peruvian countryside where 35 percent of the population is still defined as poor (INEI, 2009).

The second type of preference structure that obscures the relation between empowerment and material outcomes is altruism. If you care for others rather than yourself, both observed outcomes and decision-making process would favour others. Perceived low empowerment through choices being made might then be misleading simply because another more favourable outcome for that individual would be possible. Agarwal (1997) postulates that women tend to care more for other household members compared to men, e.g. the latter spend more on buying more personal consumption goods such as tobacco, alcohol, etc. (Hoddinott & Haddad 1995)<sup>5</sup>. Women are thought to spend more on health, education, etc., but they also demonstrate a preference for individual luxury goods like jewellery and costly traditional clothes in the Peruvian highland.

The unitary household model is defined to be a household where a change in income between members will not change the overall consumption pattern, i.e. the preferences of the household is independent of who earns the money. According to Becker (1991) will there be no changes in consumption if only one of the household members is an altruist. A redistribution of assets or income between individuals within or after marriage will not lead to a change in the household consumption pattern. Households in developing countries dominated by a single person are often taken to be the empirical representation of this model. Such “dictators” (or “*patras/matras familias*”) might care more or less for other household members, i.e. different degrees of altruism in his/her preferences. He/she might therefore impose his/her own will or role in order to coordinate the needs of all household members<sup>6</sup>.

The seminal theoretical papers of Manser and Brown (1980) and Lundberg and Pollack (1993) introduce explicit household bargaining. The former develops a cooperative bargaining model with explicit utility functions for each spouse. Marriage dissolution with the resulting utility level represents the threat point of the game. The Nash equilibrium solution maximizes the weighted sum of differences between the utility of the negotiated solution and the utility of the threat point for the woman and the man, respectively. The main idea is that the spouses agree, and make binding agreements, on individual behaviour in order to achieve an outcome that is better for both, compared to the threat point.

Lundberg and Pollack (1993) use a similar household bargaining model. The threat point however is a non-cooperative behaviour within the marriage as dissolutions can be prohibitively expensive (for example due to social sanctions). The main assumption is that each individual controls their own income, and will contribute to a collective good taking the other spouse contribution. Land ownership by women will then increase her individual income as far as she really controls the land rent from her own property.

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<sup>5</sup> However, the interpretation of such consumption as selfishness is not straightforward. Individual adaptation to social expectations of seemingly unproductive behavior might also be optimal for the family, e.g. job opportunities are often circulated between drinking buddies.

<sup>6</sup> However, dictatorial power within households might be less common than popular perceptions indicates. Wüig et al. (2009) found that male household leaders in the strong matrilineal culture of southern Malawi are merely figureheads presenting the consensus reached by the various women in the larger household to the outside world. Such households are hence in fact a complex set of intra household negotiations where household expenditure patterns will depend on income/asset distribution between individuals.

According to Agarwal (1997), these discussions on cooperative bargaining solutions focus too narrowly on the threat point. In her view, the distribution of total surplus from collaboration will depend on norms, expectations, social pressure, knowledge, individual preferences, brut power, etc., that affect the negotiation process over the joint surplus of staying married instead of divorce. Indicators of human assets, culture and social interaction are hence elements of the “negotiation power” parameter linked to the difference between outcome and threat point in the Nash cooperative bargaining model solution. These theoretical papers take negotiation process related to power as fixed values when discussing the effect of varying asset and income. Agarwal also refers to Sen (1990) which postulates that the distribution of surplus according to contribution and/or need are two possible contrary principles that anyhow often coexist. More land rent to the women will hence not only affect the threat point of no cooperation, but also influence the outcome through the effect of the “according to contribution” norm in the negotiation process itself.

Surprisingly few empirical studies document the effect of land ownership on women’s empowerment in developing countries. Furthermore, the use of different indicators in the literature makes comparison difficult as the influence of women, hence empowerment, might differ over tasks, place and time. The endogeneity of asset is another problem that is only possible to overcome with panel data or valid instrument variables. Few such datasets exist as more explicit indicators of empowerment are seldom included in large surveys and register data.

There are five main categories of empowerment indicators in the literature. There is trend of using the actual behaviour of individuals in the expanding economic experiments literature. Carlsson et al. (2009) elicits joint and individual risk preferences of Chinese couples, and do not find any differences between joint and individual behaviour. In a companion paper of the PeruLandGender research project we construct an *Empowerment* variable based on behaviour in public goods games. The contributions played by the man and women separately are later compared to the contribution when they play jointly. Our *Empowerment* variable will have a larger value the closer the joint decision is to the woman than the man, i.e. zero if joint is identical to the man’s contribution and one if identical to the woman’s contribution, as we assume bargaining between the spouses over the joint decision (Wiig et al. 2011).

In the second category, female income and assets are used as empowerment indicators in themselves. Empowered women will surpass potential resistance to labour participation outside the home by their husbands, and this literature further assumes that she will control at least part of her income herself. Peterman (2010) traces a significant effect of exogenous changes in land inheritance and ownership rights at the community level on individual women’s employment and earning opportunities in a 13-year longitudinal household panel study in Tanzania. However, endogenous feedback effects can’t be ruled out even in this fixed effect panel model. When female labour participation increases, more empowered women can press for improved ownership and inheritance rights to land. Labour economics using register data in developed countries often analyze income and labour participation by gender, which hence can be interpreted in the gender empowerment indicators.

The third type of empowerment indicator is the revealed consumption in combination with assumed gender differences in preferences. Ashraf et al. (2010) find that female savings products shift consumption towards products of female preference, while Rangel (2006) found that an exogenous shift in the divorce threat point through the legal introduction of alimony rights in Brazil increased investment in schooling, especially older girls. Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) show that the household expenditure share on food increases and share on tobacco and alcohol decreases as the women's share of total income increases.

The fourth possibility is to ask the household members themselves to evaluate women's influence in the household. Allendorf (2007) finds that women who own land are more likely to be reported to have the final say in household decisions in rural Nepal. Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) and Doss (2005) also use similar indicators of empowerment.

Fifth, different cultures might have different ideas about what is the domain of female and male decision-making. It is hence difficult to use one type of decision as a general indicator of empowerment across nations and cultures. Some authors use indirect measures that are thought to be general outcomes of empowerment in all cultures, e.g. matrimonial violence, age difference of couple, employment, etc. Mason and Smith (2003) find that such empowerment indicators differs between cultures in six Asian countries.

We can hence compute women's empowerment indicators of all five categories from our research material. In this descriptive report we disregard the potential endogeneity effect that often riddles causal analysis.

## 3 Gender relevant institutions and law in Peru

### 3.1 Gender issues in the civil code

The Peruvian Constitution of 1979 introduced equal rights for men and women and bans any discrimination based on gender, race or language. In 1984 the congress approved the signing of the United Nation's Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and then revised the Civil Code accordingly. Women and men now have the same duties and responsibilities, and furthermore consensual unions are recognized as a legal union if they have lasted for two years or longer (DL295, article 326) (Republic of Peru 1993, Macassi León 1996, Deere & León 1998).

The overarching principle in Partial Property in Peruvian marriage law, termed "Participation in profit" (*Sociedad de Gananciales*) locally, as in most other Latin American countries. Whatever property one of the spouses brings into marriage or inherits during marriage, or acquires through sales of such, becomes individual property according to the Civil Code (DL295, article 302/311). However, the profits and rent from such asset and other types of income belongs to both spouses and hence the property acquired through spending these resources if the relationship can be proven to have been permanent for more than two years and no impediments to marriage exists, i.e. one of couple is legally married to another (DL295, article 310).

The general rule is that all offspring get the right to inherit equal shares independently of the succession and sex of the siblings. This applies to land as well as all other types of asset. However, parents are de facto free to make inter-vivo transfers to whoever they want and land is normally transferred while the old generation is still alive. Free transfers to offsprings should be recorded as advance inheritance, but such transfers are often disguised as sales to circumvent equal inheritance rules<sup>7</sup>.

Furthermore, customary practice often differs from formal law. There is no uniform practice of land transfer between the different regional cultures. In some districts the youngest sibling normally stays at home to take care of the parents and hence inherits the land, while in other districts there is a preference for firstborn male in inheritance.

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<sup>7</sup> An interesting twist is that such disguised interitance becomes formal sales, and hence common property according to the civil code.

Peru also allows some degree of legal pluralism. This applies especially to local institutions and traditional authorities, e.g. the self-defence groups (Rondas) in the Cajamarca that can pass sentences and punish according to their own perceptions. However, affected parties can always bring the case to formal courts whose sentences nullify the ruling of local institutions. However, interpretations based on local customs will also affect the rulings of the formal courts (Deere and León, (2001)). We do not find large geographical differences in the practice of inheritance rights of siblings in Peru in our sample.

### 3.2 Land titling laws

Pressure by NGOs, CSOs and international organizations led gradually to more joint titling of land (Glavin et al. 2012). However, this has probably more to do with implementation than the formulation of legal norms.

The different laws and directives introduced as legal instruments for the titling process only refer to equal rights between men and women in a more general way. The phrase "...credit the solicitors rights to the parcel and, in their cases, of the spouse or cohabitant" in DL667 from 1991 is repeated, but not further specified in any later law or directive. However, the explicit instruction of how to conduct joint titling appears in the registry Form A to be used in the field, a form which was first approved as a Supreme Decree (04-95-JUS) given in the The National Superintendence of Public Registry Office (SUNARP) resolution late 1996 (206-96-SUNARP). It says the spouse/cohabitants name should also be included in the rubric for "solicitor of possession rights", a necessary condition to obtain property rights, if the solicitor (i) is married or (ii) is concubine without impediment to getting married. If impediments exist, joint children who live on the premises should be included instead. This rule hence formulates explicit orders of issuing joint titling even though there is no references for explicit law article to back this requirement. Only minor changes, like replacing the word "concubine" with "cohabitant" appears in later versions that were also made public in SUNARP resolutions<sup>8</sup>.

The intention to issuing joint titles also appears in early communication between the government and the project donor IDB. The PIRT1 loan proposal from the Ministry of Agriculture to IDB (Republic of Peru 1995:31) states, "...that the registry offices must, by law, require that the names of both husband and wife appear on the application for property registration..." The implicit justification for joint ownership is probably that the government considered "possession" different from "property", something that neglects customary law and practices as well as historic background that are normally respected in land property formalization processes. It hence implies that a son/daughter who inherit a parcel of land, would achieve individual ownership if his/her father had a title deed to the land, but would have to share with spouse/cohabitant if no such document existed. This breaks with the basic idea of "formalizing the informal" in titling programs. In practice, few had cared to make the complicated and costly application of formal property rights as rights and duties were

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<sup>8</sup> Regional PETT offices often had their own interpretation. Deere and León (2001) tell how the regional head of PETT urged women to get married because he thought the law was not relevant to unmarried couples.



set in customary law and practice. However, PETT would now consider both spouses/cohabitants possessors as they lived on the land in the specific moment in time when PETT arrived, independent of the previous “possession” history of the land<sup>9</sup>. This explains why our informants define joint titling as a “non-discriminatory practice” rather than an integral element of redistribution between sexes in the formalization agenda.

PETT informers verify the idea that married women should receive joint titles from the beginning of PTRT1, “...in this aspect the law was clear; if a couple is married they should both receive the title”<sup>10</sup>. When PETT came to the parcel, the individual owner had to prove that the land was purchased before they became a couple. If they were not able to prove this, the title was given as joint property. Some informants indicate that the legal backing for the joint titling practice is “dubious”, something that is admitted by COFOPRI urban officers in a World Bank workshop who, “...[we] had a formalization protocol with specific instructions to secure the rights of women that are not formalized in official directives” (Endo 2009).

The titling agency at least formally strived for joint titling both for married and cohabitating couples from the very start, and we do not find any major changes in legal norms that might affect joint ownership over time. However, civil society organizations might have influenced PETT officers to implement joint titling in practice as well, occurring in the aims and strategy of the PETT leadership over time.

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<sup>9</sup> Deere and Leon (1998) says that there was no requirement of civil status before 1996 and hence not explicit demand for joint titling. In personal communication, Deere says unpublished notes from field work interviews indicate that joint titling was actually pushed by the Peruvian bureaucracy which feared omitted spouses would later demand property rights based on possession rights independent of previous ownership to the parcel. At the time of change in Form A, they could not trace any active pressure from either NGOs, IDB or politicians to introduce joint ownership. We have not been able to find the initial Form A without reference to joint titling.

<sup>10</sup> Personal communication with PETT agents.

## 4 Methodology

### 4.1 Research objective

The main research interest of the PeruLandGender project is to evaluate the consequences of joint titling on gender equality within the household rather than the position of women in the public domain. To answer this question, we chose to restrict our survey universe in four dimensions, which implies that it is not representative for the whole population of Peru.

First, we chose households with a “principal couple” present most of the year. These are sentimental partners of opposite sex that carry most economic responsibility and decision making power within the household, i.e. persons sharing a housing unit and meals for at least 9 months a year. Single parent households are hence excluded. Secondly, we searched for areas where the titling effort had led to a real change from individual to joint property rights in the society. We proxy this by choosing a district with a high incidence of both titling and joint property. We assume this is due to change rather than a pre-PETT gender culture. Thirdly, a special feature of the Peruvian titling law implied that individual titles could not be issued in Recognized Peasant Communities (CCR), as these already had a right to a title deed as one single “legal subject”. We hence chose districts where the number of CCR and other types of communities roughly balanced in order to compare communities with and without individual titles. Fourth, we chose to focus on the Southern and Central Andes highland with a rather homogenous indigenous population of small scale peasants, leaving out the Coast and Northern highland that have a different cultural background and market relations. Our analysis is hence valid for the subcategory of households and districts where the titling effort is expected to represent a real change in the property rights regime.

We used a typical “qualitative-quantitative” approach by applying three different methods to investigate the same issue during fieldwork in 2010. We started by making semi-structured in-depth interviews and observations. Eight Quechua-speaking anthropological students from the University of The Highland in Puno lived with households for a week, obtaining a qualitative sample of 32 households in 8 communities in Puno and Apurimac Departments. The PeruLandGender researchers simultaneously interviewed experts and key informers on gender and land. These are sources for analysis by themselves, and furthermore constitute the input to the formulation of the questions in the PeruLandGender household survey which will be discussed a length in this report. Finally, a separate team of economists

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conducted experimental games with the households participating in a survey to construct other dimensions of empowerment.

## 4.2 Household survey

### 4.2.1 Sampling

The main household survey was conducted in 1,280 households in eight highland districts in the four departments Cusco, Apurímac, Ayacucho and La Libertad. As discussed in the previous section, the sampling of districts was made using both a purposive and probabilistic strategy with the following four criteria: (i) high levels of land titling, (ii) more than half of those parcels should be titled jointly, (iii) a balance between CCR and “private” communities (CP)<sup>11</sup> and (iv) excluding high-altitude pasture-based communities with limited involvement in agriculture. We selected at random four CCR and four CP categories in each district and then chose replacements randomly if necessary.

When visiting the selected communities, a list of households which possessed at least one parcel of land was made in collaboration with the president of the community and other authorities. Twenty households were then drawn at random, and replacements in case of absence or refusal to participate were also drawn at random from the remaining households on the list.

Sampling and data collection was originally done with the aim of studying the rural land titling program’s effect on intra-household dynamics and female empowerment. This treatment effect of being a CCR compared to CP will be exploited in future analysis. However, in both systems the community members have defacto individual tenure rights and hence do not represent a real difference in tenure rights.

### 4.2.2 Questionnaires

Official datasets have few good indicators of intra-household decision-making. We hence designed our own household survey questionnaire to include the different dimensions of women empowerment. We introduce the term *principal couple* in the household, by which we mean a couple consisting of a man and a woman who contribute most to the household economy and take most of the decisions within and on behalf of the household. In multi-couple households they would typically be middle aged, while older (parents) and younger (children with spouse/cohabitant) are assumed to be less important. We interviewed the principal couple first jointly (household module), and then we interviewed the man and the woman of the principal couple separately applying the exact same questions to both (defined as the individual modules). Any reference to woman and man in the following text will actually refer to each of the partners in the principal couple. This also implies that

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<sup>11</sup> In an impact analysis comparing communities within the same district one minimizes the potential omitted variable bias as we assume that the culture, the history and the current socio-political context is more or less the same within the district. In this analysis a district dummy will correct for these cultural effects.

single-head households (which normally consist of single mothers and widows) are not included in this survey. Data collection was conducted by the Peruvian survey company CUANTO using Quechua-speaking surveyors and supervisors in the regions where this language dominated. The researchers followed data collection closely by being an integral part of the fieldwork at all times and contributed wherever it was needed to complete within the set time limit.

The module for joint interview of the principal couple includes questions on socioeconomic information, questions about division and allocation of labour, plot level information about the tenure regime, agricultural investments and production, an income module, assets holdings and questions on the household's access to credit. The idea is that the couple through discussions will give more reliable information. We were rather successful in achieving the presence of both spouses and the enumerator furthermore indicated the relative involvement of the partners in the process. Men talk significantly more, but the difference is not as large as men occupy 58 percent and women 42 percent of the interview time.

The individual questionnaires were conducted in private with each of the spouses on more conflictive issues, in order to secure truthful information. Some questions are repeated, e.g. ownership of assets, to control whether individual answers coincide with the household module. It also includes questions on intra-household decision-making, income pooling and transparency, intra-household violence, contraceptive use, and perceptions about behaviour related to gender roles and relations.

## 5 Household description

We conducted our survey in the highland departments of Ayacucho, Apurimac, Cusco and La Libertad, all relatively poor regions of Peru with indigenous people. Nearly all were native Quechua speakers in the three former, but none in the last department. Descriptive statistics on household socioeconomic characteristics are given in Table 5.1 below. The overall literacy level is high being mainly indigenous poor people with a small difference between 86,6 percent for men and 64,1 percent for women. The improved education level is apparent as nearly all sons and daughters knew how to read and write.

Table 5.1 *Characteristics of principal couple*

	Obs #	%	st. dev.
Literacy man	1280	86,6	0,3
Literacy woman	1280	64,1	0,5
Literacy sons above school age	1115	97,3	0,2
Literacy daughters above school age	997	97,8	0,1
Native speaker man	1280	73,7	0,4
Native speaker woman	1280	73,7	0,4
Only native speaker man	1280	8,4	0,3
Only native speaker woman	1280	19,7	0,4
Receiving Juntos	1280	75,1	0,4
Migration man	1280	6,1	0,2
Migration woman	1280	0,2	0,4
Migration of any previous HH member	1280	48,3	0,5

Difference between men and women on given social characteristics. Obs # is the number of households with observation of this dummy variable, % the share with a positive value, st. dev. is the standard deviation. Source: PeruLandGender 2010 survey.

Table 5.2 *Numerical household characteristics:*

	# Obs	#	St. dev.
Family size	1280	4,5	1,8
Man	1280	1,0	
Woman	1280	1,0	
Sons	1280	1,2	1,2
Daughters	1280	1,1	1,1
Others	1280	0,3	0,7
Age CP man	1280	47,5	14,6
Age CP woman	1280	44,3	14,5
Marriage years	1280	23,6	14,2
Education level man	1280	2,9	1,4
Education level woman	1280	2,2	1,3

The number of different types of household members and the education level for some of them. Source: PeruLandGender 2010 survey.

People are considered members of the same household if: (i) they share meals, (ii) sleep in the same “home” and (iii) have been living there for at least three of the last twelve months. The typical household has 4,5 members, always consisting of a man and a woman of the principal couple. They had on average 1,2 sons, 1,1 daughters and 0,3 in the other category of parents, cousins, nephews, etc. or people not directly related to the bloodline currently living with them in the household.

The mean age for the male of the principal couple is 47 years and for the woman 44 years. This unexpectedly high age probably reflects the ongoing transition from rural to urban living, as young people tend to migrate to the cities. We found that at least one previous household member has emigrated in 48 percent of the households.

The rural population is ethnically and culturally highly indigenous in Peru, split into Aymara in the south and Quechua speaking groups in the central and northern highlands. However, they define themselves as peasants rather than indigenous due to different historical trajectories compared to for example the neighbouring country of Bolivia. The mother tongue for 73 percent of both women and men in our sample is Quechua. However, Spanish is commonly applied even though a larger share of women with 20 percent and men with 8 percent are native mono-linguistic. Our areas were relatively poor and most households qualify for the conditional cash transfer program Juntos. However, the program is not fully operational in all districts and 25 percent of our households were hence not included in the program.

Most people actually found their partners within the community since 54 percent of the principal couples were actually from the same community (see Table A3 in the appendix). When we look at the younger cohorts, we find that the trend is falling. However, it is difficult to indicate mechanisms as several processes like migration, civil conflict, etc., might have influenced the cohorts differently.

## 6 Land distribution

### 6.1 Previous surveys

The Peruvian Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) from year 2000 was one of the first country surveys in Latin America to register agricultural land by gender of the owner within the household (Deere & León 2001). Previously, like in the latest agricultural census of 1994, data collection did not differentiate between the different individuals composing the household, but rather regarded the male to be the agriculturalist and hence the owner of the land.

Table 6.1 *Property rights in GRADE and LSMS data sets*

		GRADE2004					LSMS2000				
		Male %	Female %	Joint %	Other %	Obs #	Male %	Female %	Joint %	Other %	Obs #
All plots	PETT	26,8	20,3	42,8	10,1	4176	72,6	5,6	16,1	5,6	124
	No-PETT	23,3	15,8	39,3	21,6	924	78,4	5,0	12,1	4,5	1877
	All	26,3	19,0	41,3	13,5	5686	78,1	5,0	12,3	4,5	2001
Couple	PETT	24,9	10,1	55,0	10,0	3081					
	No-PETT	24,3	7,1	49,5	19,1	691					
	All	25,5	9,2	52,9	12,4	4177					

Share of number of parcels that is considered property of individual household members, i.e. man, woman, joint and other household member combination. In the GRADE 2004 survey we first refer to the whole sample in the upper part and then to the subgroup of households where both men and women are present, i.e. not including single-head households. The Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) from the year 2000 does not give such information.

In Table 6.1, we find more than 78 percent of the parcels in the Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) from the year 2000 are considered the individual property of the man, while only 12 percent is joint property. However, the difference between parcels with and without PETT title is small and not statistically significant. This is probably due to the rather small number of only 124 parcels registered with PETT titles in this survey (6 percent of the sample). Men dominate if the figures are taken at face value, but there is considerable room for misunderstanding in the questionnaire as the response might reflect who is considered the “main agriculturalist” rather than the person having property rights to the land itself.

The share of joint ownership is considerably larger in the data from the Peruvian Research Institute GRADE survey collected to evaluate the impact of PETT titling on behalf of the project donor Inter-American Development Bank in 2004. By analysing this data, Fuentes and Wiig (2009) found a higher incidence of joint titling ownership in both the full-households sample and the subcategory of dual-headed

households compared to the LSMS figures. The data is also split between parcels with and without PETT title even though the number of observations in the latter group is relatively small, i.e. only 27 percent of the sample and hence the opposite of the sampling in LSMS where untitled parcels are overrepresented. However, the data are only indicative as the LSMS sample is representative of the whole country while the GRADE samples only for districts where PETT had started to issue individual titles.

The difference in joint titling between the two surveys is only four years apart and is probably an effect of the individual PETT titling program. This result is in line with the qualitative investigation on the PETT process in Glavin et al. (2012). Furthermore, the complete COFOPRI cadastre of rural properties discloses a similar trend of increased joint titling between the P1RT1 phase in 1996-2000 and P1RT2 phase in 2002-2006 in Table A1 in the Appendix. Only 44 percent of the more than one million parcels titled in the first phase was found to have joint titles, while the number increases to 57 percent for the about half a million parcels titled in the second phase. The COFOPRI numbers illustrate the expected rise in joint titling over time since we do not believe there are estimation bias problems that appear in just one of the periods. The overview also shows considerable regional differences. Some departments started out at a high level of joint titling early in the process, and hence experienced a smaller increase or even a decrease<sup>12</sup>.

## 6.2 PeruLandGender

### 6.2.1 Ownership

The PeruLandGender household survey takes oral answers by respondents at face value. We did not ask for written documentation, as the respondents would probably have difficulties in finding them on a short notice. Furthermore, they might become suspicious to the purpose of the survey. The team hence asked the respondents for the names given on the PETT title deed, rather than requesting the physical title deed to check for ourselves, in line with a similar study in Ecuador (Deere & Contreras Diaz 2011).

We also followed their approach by require denomination of explicit individuals in the response categories of the questionnaires, e.g. household ID or a wide range of narrow categories like parents, neighbours, friends, etc. by their sex and geographical distance. However, when it comes to “ownership” of household possessions, most actually belong to the man and woman of the principal couple, separately or jointly.

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<sup>12</sup> The World Bank workshop on land governance in Peru were informed by COFOPRI employees of the respective share of title deed holders in the cadastre that were men and women, i.e. no calculation of joint ownership, and reports 53.5 percent for women in urban areas and 51.1 percent in rural areas (Endo 2009). We use the same database to approximate the number of joint ownership based by introducing the following assumptions: When there is only one owner, then the number of male and female is considered individual property. When there is more than one owner, the smallest number of male and female is interpreted as the number of joint property, and the difference considered individual ownership for the sex with the largest number reported. Joint property might hence be overestimated, but the approximation is probably not too far from the reality.



The *Other* category is the remaining combination of people that hence might include the man and woman of the principal couple too.

In the following tables only parcels of which at least one of the household members is considered the owner will be included. Notification will be given in the specific cases where I deviate from this general rule by including parcels owned by non-household members in the analysis. There are 4110 such parcels, or 90 percent of the 4567 parcels owned or managed by the households. Of these 4110 parcels, 89 percent are actually cultivated by the household and 11 percent either rented out to others or just left idle. In Table 6.2 the mean number of parcels in this subsample is 3,21 parcels, covering a total 2,3 hectare with a subjectively given total value by the respondents of 16.298 soles. The average parcel soil quality indicator is 2,76.

Most land is actually considered to be jointly owned by the principal couple with 85 percent of all parcels. The parcels of women tend to be smaller, but more valuable per hectare as their share of the respectively area and value is respectively 2,4 percent and 4 percent. The subjective quality indicator of the land does not vary significantly.

Table 6.2 *Subjective land ownership to all HH owned parcels*

	Titled parcels		Area HA/parcel	Area of land		Total Value		Quality Ind.
	#	%		HA	%	Soles	%	
Man	0,31	9,7	0,81	0,25	10,8	1472	9,0	2,69
Woman	0,13	4,0	0,43	0,06	2,4	652	4,0	2,76
Couple	2,73	85,0	0,72	1,97	84,3	13641	83,7	2,77
Other	0,04	1,2	1,46	0,06	2,5	533	3,3	2,75
All	3,21	100,0	0,73	2,33	100,0	16298	100,0	2,76

Distribution of the 4110 agricultural parcels that are owned by at least one household member, type given in lines. First column is the mean number of parcels and then distributed by percentage share, the second is the mean size of the parcels in hectares, the third the total area of land in HA, the fourth value in soles and the final mean land quality indicator for these parcel. Source: PeruLandGender 2010 survey.

These 4110 household owned parcels can be divided into the three subcategories: 1072 parcels (26,1%) with PETT title; 726 parcels (17,7%) with other type of written documentation; and 2312 parcels (56,3%) with no written documentation at all. The distribution of ownership by household members are given in table 6.3-5 below

Table 6.3 *Subjective land ownership to HH parcels with PETT title*

	Titled parcels		Area HA/parcel	Area of land		Value		Quality Ind.
	#	%		HA	%	Soles	%	
Man	0,06	6,8	1,18	0,07	8,9	428	6,6	2,71
Woman	0,03	3,8	0,41	0,01	1,7	234	3,6	2,63
Couple	0,74	88,2	0,89	0,66	86,5	5482	84,7	2,82
Other	0,01	1,2	2,18	0,02	2,9	329	5,1	2,85
All	0,84	100,0	0,91	0,76	100,0	6472	100,0	2,81

Distribution of the 1072 agricultural parcels belonging to at least one household member by lines. First column is the mean number of parcels and then distributed by percentage share, the second is the mean size of the parcels in hectares, the third the total area of land in HA, the fourth value in

soles and the final mean land quality indicator for these parcel. Source: PeruLandGender 2010 survey.

Table 6.4 *Subjective land ownership to HH parcels with other titles*

	Titled parcels		Area	Area of land		Value		Quality
	#	%	HA/parcel	HA	%	Soles	%	Ind.
Man	0,06	10,9	1,00	0,06	14,3	380	10,7	2,65
Woman	0,02	3,9	0,77	0,02	3,9	160	4,5	2,68
Couple	0,48	83,7	0,73	0,34	79,8	2985	83,7	2,71
Other	0,01	1,5	1,00	0,01	2,0	43	1,2	2,55
All	0,57	100,0	0,76	0,43	100,0	3567	100,0	2,70

Distribution of the 726 agricultural parcels belonging to at least one household member by lines. First column is the mean number of parcels and then distributed by percentage share, the second is the mean size of the parcels in hectares, the third the total area of land in HA, the fourth value in soles and the final mean land quality indicator for these parcel. Source: PeruLandGender 2010 survey.

Table 6.5 *Subjective ownership on HH parcels with no title*

	Titled parcels		Area	Area of land		Value		Quality
	#	%	HA/parcel	HA	%	Soles	%	Ind.
Man	0,19	10,6	0,65	0,12	10,8	664	10,6	2,70
Woman	0,07	4,1	0,34	0,03	2,2	259	4,1	2,85
Couple	1,52	84,0	0,64	0,97	84,4	5174	82,7	2,73
Other	0,02	1,3	1,31	0,03	2,6	161	2,6	2,79
All	1,81	100,0	0,63	1,15	100,0	6258	100,0	2,73

Distribution of property rights to the 2312 household owned parcels that has no form of written documentation of ownership on parcels, by lines. First column is the mean number of parcels and then distribution by percentage share, the second is the mean size of the parcels in hectares, the third the total area of land in HA, the fourth value in soles and the final mean land quality indicator for these parcel. Source: PeruLandGender HH survey 2010.

There only minor differences in the household composition of subjective ownership rights in the three tables above. If we compare subjective ownership with registered property rights by PETT or rights registered by other authorities, we find a some characteristic differences.

The distribution by category of registered owner on the PETT title deed is given in Table 6.6 below. The share jointly owned is lower with 75,9 percent of the parcels, considerably below the 88 percent response for subjectively perceived ownership on the same parcels (see Table 6.3). The difference is mainly due to a similar increase in the *Other* category. Qualitative interviews disclose that land defacto transferred to and farmed by the younger generation might still be formally owned by the older generation.

Table 6.6 *Registered ownership of HH parcels with PETT titles*

	Titled parcels		Area HA/parcel	Area of land		Value		Quality Ind.
	#	%		HA	%	Soles	%	
Man	0,06	7,3	1,06	0,07	8,5	494	7,6	2,72
Woman	0,03	3,8	0,55	0,02	2,3	241	3,7	2,73
Couple	0,64	75,9	0,96	0,61	80,2	4919	76,0	2,83
Other	0,11	13,0	0,62	0,07	8,9	818	12,6	2,79
All	0,84	100,0	0,91	0,77	100,0	6472	100,0	2,81

Distribution of registered property rights by household members on 1072 PETT registered parcels by lines. First column is the mean number of parcels and then distributed by percentage share, the second is the mean size of the parcels in hectares, the third the total area of land in HA, the fourth value in soles and the final mean land quality indicator for these parcel. Source: PeruLandGender HH survey 2010.

There is a similar pattern for parcels with other documentation given in table 6.7 below. Our six subcategories cover historical documents, for example by the ministry of agriculture, and verification of ownership by traditional authorities. These were often issued on demand by individuals (normally men) for specific purposes, rather than for comprehensive processes involving the whole society and the other household members. The higher share of individual ownership by men is hence of no surprise and underlines the importance of comprehensive and transparent processes to achieve joint ownership.

Table 6.7 *Registered ownership of HH parcels with other titles*

	Titled parcels		Area HA/parcel	Area of land		Value		Quality Ind.
	#	%		HA	%	Soles	%	
Man	0,10	18,3	0,62	0,06	14,9	526	14,7	2,68
Woman	0,03	4,5	0,82	0,02	4,9	207	5,8	2,55
Couple	0,40	70,1	0,77	0,31	71,0	2550	71,5	2,72
Other	0,04	7,0	0,99	0,04	9,2	284	8,0	2,63
All	0,57	100,0	0,76	0,43	100,0	3567	100,0	2,70

Distribution of property rights to the 726 parcels that has any form of written documentation of ownership on parcels, by lines. First column is the mean number of parcels and then distribution by percentage share, the second is the mean size of the parcels in hectares, the third the total area of land in HA, the fourth value in soles and the final mean land quality indicator for these parcel. Source: PeruLandGender HH survey 2010.

## 6.2.2 Inheritance

The high share of joint ownership can have two possible explanations. First, historical social norms might actually be joint ownership of land between spouses in traditional highland communities. Secondly, PETT imposed joint ownership whenever no written proof of individual ownership existed from the very start. Any individual with a deviating perception would have a hard time to fight both the local perception and the state bureaucracy to achieve individual ownership.

It is straightforward to check whether individual property rights in accordance with the civil code on inheritance or inter-vivo family transfers are fulfilled or not. In Table 6.8 below we have 2260 parcels of the 4110 parcels owned reported as being inherited (or 54 percent). Of these, 66 percent is inherited by the man and 34 percent by the woman, reflecting an existing preference for male offspring in succession of land.

Table 6.8 *Inheritance of all land*

	Inherited by	
	Man	Woman
Titled parcels, #	323	175
Man title	11 %	3 %
Woman title	2 %	15 %
Joint title	68 %	62 %
Other title	19 %	20 %
Untitled parcels, #	1159	603
Man owner	18 %	2 %
Woman owner	1 %	17 %
Joint owner	80 %	78 %
Other owner	1 %	20 %

Number of inherited land parcels, by women and men, in the first line. The following line indicates how this land is currently distributed, in soles and percent of the total inherited value. Source: PeruLandGender HH survey 2010.

We see that 68 percent of the titled parcels inherited by the man has joint property rights (62 percent for the man), while the share of subjective ownership is higher for untitled inherited parcels. The difference is as previously shown due to formal ownership by the older generation with a high percentage for the “other” category. Anyway, the percentage should have been zero if informal possessions rights had been respected as formal property rights and the formal partial property marriage law had been followed.

Cross transfers, i.e. land inherited by one spouse but owned alone by the other spouse is extremely rare and few cases probably reflect misunderstandings by the respondents.

### 6.2.3 Difference CP and CCR

A fundamental assumption in this study is that communities within the same district had similar cultures and perceptions of property rights before PETT started to issue individual titles to only some of them. People living in Recognised Peasant Communities (CCR) are not eligible for the individual titling since their community is registered as one single legal subject with formal property rights to all land within the community boundaries. Thirty-three have a communal PETT title to their land while five still lack such formalization of joint property rights. On the other hand, people living in “private communities” (CP) do get individual PETT titles to their land.

Communities living side-by-side are hence treated differently. We are now in the process of calculating pre-PETT similarities and differences between CP and CCR by both mean household and community characteristics, applying the latest comprehensive census which exists in Peru, i.e. the agricultural census from 1994 (CENAGRO94) and population census from 1993 (CPV93). The results will be reported in a companion paper.

In Table 6.9 below, we report some characteristics split by community type as they are today from our own survey as previously discussed. We cannot distinguish between possible cultural differences and titling effects for CCR and CP in these post-PETT figures.

Table 6.9 *All parcels by HH by subjective ownership, by community type*

		Number		Area	Value		Quality
		#	%	HA/parcel	Soles	%	Ind.
CCR	Man	251	10,5	0,76	1558	10,8	2,69
	Woman	85	3,6	0,43	477	3,3	2,91
	Couple	2018	84,4	0,71	11991	82,9	2,77
	Other	36	1,5	1,85	445	3,1	2,72
	All	2390	100	0,72	14471	100,0	2,76
CP	Man	147	8,5	0,90	1387	7,7	2,69
	Woman	78	4,5	0,44	825	4,6	2,62
	Couple	1478	85,9	0,74	15265	84,4	2,73
	Other	17	1,0	0,63	620	3,4	2,82
	All	1720	100	0,74	18097	100,0	2,72

Total number of parcels titled, by CCR above and CP below. Second column is the mean size of those in hectares, third total value in soles, fourth percentage of total value, and fifth the mean quality indicator for this land. Source: PeruLandGender survey 2010.

For the subgroup of PETT titled parcels, the share jointly owned is marginally larger in CP than in CCR, as presented in Table 6.10 below. The number of observations in CCR, however, is just 90 parcels and hence confirms that PETT complied with the law that prohibits such individual titling in CCR.

Table 6.10 *Parcels with PETT title by registered owner, by community type*

		Number		Area HA/parcel	Value		Quality Ind.
		#	%		Soles	%	
CCR	Man	14	15,6	0,72	112	13,1	3,00
	Woman	1	1,1	2,50	19	2,2	3,00
	Couple	65	72,2	1,64	522	61,0	2,83
	Other	10	11,1	3,33	203	23,7	2,60
	All	90	100	1,70	856	100,0	2,83
CP	Man	65	6,6	1,14	871	7,3	2,66
	Woman	40	4,1	0,50	459	3,8	2,73
	Couple	749	76,3	0,90	9248	77,1	2,83
	Other	128	13,0	0,41	1424	11,9	2,80
	All	982	100	0,83	12002	100,0	2,81

Total number of parcels titled, by CCR above and CP below. The second column is the mean size of those in hectares, third mean value in soles, fourth percentage of total value, and fifth the mean quality indicator for this land. Source: PeruLandGender 2010 survey.

A similar analysis for the 1305 parcels with other written property documentation given to at least one of the current household members is given in Table 6.11 below. We see that the incidence and value of joint titling is considerably lower, something which also emphasizes the joint titling agenda of PETT compared to the male domination in the pre-PETT documentation that normally were initiated by the household itself.

Table 6.11 *Parcels with other documentation by registered owner, by community type*

		Number		Area HA/parcel	Value		Quality Ind.
		#	%		Soles	%	
CCR	Man	87	21,6	0,50	623	19,2	2,81
	Woman	11	2,7	0,95	84	2,6	2,82
	Couple	271	67,2	0,71	2153	66,3	2,72
	Other	34	8,4	1,16	385	11,9	2,53
	All	403	100	0,71	3245	100,0	2,73
CP	Man	46	14,2	0,86	431	11,1	2,46
	Woman	22	6,8	0,75	328	8,4	2,41
	Couple	238	73,7	0,84	2940	75,7	2,72
	Other	17	5,3	0,65	185	4,8	2,82
	All	323	100	0,83	3884	100,0	2,67

Total number of parcels with other type of written documentation, by CCR above and CP below. The second column is the mean size of those in hectares, third mean value in soles per hectare, fourth percentage of total value, and fifth the mean quality indicator for this land. Source: PeruLandGender HH survey 2010.

## 7 Other assets

Animals are the second most important asset for the household, thus also representing an important source of income. The common assumption is that women dominate the animal sector, but we surprisingly find that nearly reported animals to be jointly owned, see Table 7.1 below.

Table 7.1 *Ownership of animals*

<i>Type</i>	<i>Animals</i> #	Share Man %	Share Woman %	Share Joint %	Total %
Cow	758	2,4	0,9	96,7	100,0
Calf	440	1,6	0,5	98,0	100,0
Bull	667	1,8	2,2	96,0	100,0
Sheep	625	4,3	0,2	95,5	100,0
Goat	103	5,8	0,0	94,2	100,0
Pig	869	5,1	0,0	94,9	100,0
Donkey	499	1,2	1,0	97,8	100,0
Horse	244	1,2	0,4	98,4	100,0
Hen	1045	8,0	0,1	91,9	100,0
Guinea pig	873	8,4	0,0	91,6	100,0
Duck	176	4,0	0,0	96,0	100,0
Bee keeper	48	0,0	2,1	97,9	100,0
Other	76	10,5	0,0	89,5	100,0
All	6423	4,6	0,5	94,9	100,0

The reported total number of animals owned by the household, and the share of those by different reported owners. Source: PeruLandGender HH survey 2010.

In the aggregate, 95 percent is jointly owned and the share is higher than 90 percent for all types except the *Other* category. However, the gender pattern becomes visible in the responsibility of taking care of the animals given in Table 7.2 below. It is then a more complex set and we hence apply more categories. The couple, either alone or in combination with others, are jointly responsible for their daily care of 54,6 percent of the animals, while the expected female domain in animal husbandry becomes apparent for the rest as the corresponding number for women is 29,3 percent and only 3 percent for men. However, the large share of joint responsibility indicates that the gender division is not as sharp as expected.

Table 7.2 *Responsibility for animals*

Animal	HH #	Woman Man Couple							Total %
		Woman %	Man %	Couple %	w/other %	w/other %	w/other %	Other %	
Cow	754	14,9	2,8	36,2	12,2	0,7	22,5	10,7	100,0
Calf	440	9,8	4,1	35,5	9,5	1,1	27,0	13,0	100,0
Bull	666	22,1	3,0	31,5	11,4	1,2	20,4	10,4	100,0
Sheep	625	20,3	1,6	33,3	10,6	1,1	19,5	13,6	100,0
Goat	103	26,2	1,0	38,8	9,7	0,0	17,5	6,8	100,0
Pig	869	22,4	1,2	31,5	10,7	0,7	21,4	12,1	100,0
Donkey	499	21,2	3,8	33,3	10,2	1,2	18,6	11,6	100,0
Horse	244	10,2	3,3	45,5	5,7	0,8	22,5	11,9	100,0
Hen	1045	21,0	1,1	32,7	9,8	0,6	19,0	15,8	100,0
Guinea pig	873	22,1	0,9	31,4	9,4	0,7	19,7	15,8	100,0
Duck	176	13,1	2,3	37,5	8,0	0,6	25,0	13,6	100,0
Bee keeper	5	0,0	0,0	20,0	20,0	20,0	20,0	20,0	100,0
Other	109	4,6	5,5	26,6	9,2	1,8	28,4	23,9	100,0
All	6408	19,1	2,1	33,6	10,2	0,9	21,0	13,2	100,0

The reported total number of animals where information on responsibility is given, and the share of those by gender. Source: PeruLandGender 2010 survey.

We see that women are more responsible for the marketing process of animals in Table 7.3 below. The number of reported animals sold during the last 12 months is rather low with 791 heads (or 12% of the total stock).



Table 7.3 *Decision to sell animals*

Animal	HH #	Decision maker							Total %
		Woman %	Man %	Couple %	Woman w.other %	Man w.other %	Couple w/other %	Other %	
Cow	133	9,0	30,1	57,1	0,0	0,0	2,3	1,5	100,0
Calf	19	15,8	42,1	36,8	0,0	0,0	5,3	0,0	100,0
Bull	174	6,3	34,5	56,3	0,0	0,6	0,6	1,7	100,0
Sheep	115	18,3	16,5	64,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,9	100,0
Goat	18	16,7	0,0	27,8	55,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0
Pig	112	35,7	20,5	42,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,9	100,0
Donkey	10	50,0	30,0	20,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0
Horse	5	0,0	60,0	20,0	0,0	0,0	20,0	0,0	100,0
Hen	92	48,9	6,5	42,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,2	100,0
Guinea pig	57	52,6	5,3	38,6	0,0	0,0	1,8	1,8	100,0
Duck	6	16,7	16,7	66,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0
Bee keeper	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Other	50	2,0	12,0	34,0	2,0	2,0	34,0	14,0	100,0
All	791	21,7	21,7	49,7	1,4	0,3	3,0	2,1	100,0

The reported total number of animals sold by the household, and the share of decision making by household member. Source: PeruLandGender dataset.

Housing is another important asset, but we left this out of the survey due to problems in estimating the transfer value separate from the plot. Very little of production asset and tools reported in Table 7.4 is for individual property of the women alone, as 49.9 percent of the objects belong to the couple jointly, 44,6 percent to the man alone and only 1,3 percent to the woman alone. The latter mainly constitutes kitchen utensils, while tools and machinery is considered the property of men.

Table 7.4 *Durable goods ownership*

	HH #	Man %	Woman %	Couple %	Other %	Total %
Truck	37	21,6	0,0	75,7	2,7	100,0
Draught oxen	520	73,5	0,0	24,6	1,9	100,0
Harvester	4	75,0	0,0	25,0	0,0	100,0
Milk machine	3	33,3	0,0	66,7	0,0	100,0
Electric motors	11	36,4	0,0	63,6	0,0	100,0
Lamps	1247	55,6	0,3	41,2	2,9	100,0
Machetes	1126	51,1	0,4	45,2	3,3	100,0
Harness	923	62,5	0,1	35,1	2,3	100,0
Axe	1196	54,1	0,3	42,8	2,8	100,0
Chaquitacla	502	68,7	0,4	28,9	2,0	100,0
Backpack	473	65,3	0,4	32,6	1,7	100,0
Wheelbarrow	672	55,1	0,4	42,6	1,9	100,0
Barn	302	18,9	1,3	76,8	3,0	100,0
Sprayer	333	46,5	0,3	51,1	2,1	100,0
Chain saw	41	41,5	4,9	48,8	4,9	100,0
Radio	1157	8,7	1,3	81,3	8,6	100,0
TV	631	5,5	0,8	84,5	9,2	100,0
Phone	546	31,0	7,0	52,4	9,7	100,0
Stove gas	203	1,0	20,2	72,9	5,9	100,0
Other	57	8,8	10,5	80,7	0,0	100,0
Total	9984	44,6	1,3	49,9	4,1	100,0

The first column is the number of HH with this type of durable goods; the following gives the distribution in ownership by HH member category in percent. Source: PeruLandGender 2010 survey.

But ownership does not necessarily imply a unilateral right to sell the asset good. In Table 7.5 below, the figures on right-to-sell or give away is considerably higher for the joint couple, but also for women, at the expense of men compared to figures for ownership reported above.

Table 7.5 *Right to alienate durable goods:*

	HH #	Man %	Woman %	Couple %	Other %	Total %
Truck	37	18,9	5,4	73,0	2,7	100,0
Draught oxen	520	54,2	1,2	41,5	3,1	100,0
Harvester	4	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0
Milk machine	3	33,3	0,0	66,7	0,0	100,0
Electric motors	11	27,3	18,2	54,5	0,0	100,0
Lamps	1247	34,1	3,0	57,9	5,0	100,0
Machetes	1126	32,9	3,3	59,0	4,9	100,0
Harness	923	39,7	2,5	53,3	4,6	100,0
Axe	1196	34,0	3,2	58,4	4,4	100,0
Chaquitacla	502	47,4	2,8	46,6	3,2	100,0
Backpack	473	44,6	0,8	53,5	1,1	100,0
Wheelbarrow	672	33,9	2,8	60,3	3,0	100,0
Barn	302	16,2	4,0	74,5	5,3	100,0
Sprayer	333	24,3	3,6	63,1	9,0	100,0
Chain saw	41	29,3	9,8	56,1	4,9	100,0
Radio	1157	12,4	3,0	78,7	5,9	100,0
TV	631	10,6	4,1	78,6	6,7	100,0
Phone	546	26,6	6,2	60,3	7,0	100,0
Stove gas	203	7,4	15,3	71,9	5,4	100,0
Other	57	12,3	5,3	78,9	3,5	100,0
Total	9984	30,7	3,4	61,1	4,8	100,0

The type of durable goods, second the number of such owned by any member of the household, then the percentage distribution by type of household member. Source: PeruLandGender survey.

## 8 Empowerment

### 8.1 Decision making

At the heart of empowerment, for both men and women, is the right to decide over your own life. We did not study the society or culture as such, but rather concentrated on decision making within the household. Do men or the women decide unilaterally on different subjects, or do they negotiate/coordinate/talk to reach a joint position?

We interviewed men and women separately and out of earshot of each other to make it easier for them to speak freely. The fact that answers by the man and the woman correlate indicates that they have the same perceptions on how decisions are made in the household. There are also some important deviations between the spouses indicating that we achieved confidentiality in the interview. First, we asked if the household had made certain decisions within four categories in a given interval of time. If yes, we asked them to report the persons making the actual decision and whether anyone disagreed<sup>13</sup>.

The first category was household purchases during the last 12 months. In Table 8.1 below we first reported on the number of households that had made such purchases, and then we reported on who actually made the decisions in those cases. Joint decision-making by the couple turns out to be the most common procedure in 2/3 of the cases. The figures given by the man in the upper part of the table and the figures given by the women in the lower parts corresponds. Men only dominate for beer and other alcohol, which is mostly consumed by the man alone.

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<sup>13</sup> Only include positive decisions to realize a given purchase/action. We hence do not include cases of negative decisions, i.e. not to realize a given purchase/action.

Table 8.1 *Household consumption decisions.*

	Decision over HH Purchase	HH #	Man %	Woman %	Couple %	Others %	Comb. %	All %
Quest. Man	School materials	929	14,2	17,2	66,8	0,5	1,2	100,0
	School uniform	882	15,0	17,6	65,4	0,6	1,5	100,0
	Beer	542	68,6	3,0	27,1	0,7	0,6	100,0
	Other alcohol	511	35,4	14,7	48,9	0,4	0,6	100,0
	School fee for boy	727	10,6	24,2	63,3	0,7	1,2	100,0
	School fee for girl	665	16,1	19,7	63,0	0,5	0,8	100,0
Quest. Woman	School materials	927	9,3	22,2	66,7	0,6	1,2	100,0
	School uniform	883	9,2	22,3	66,7	0,6	1,2	100,0
	Beer	381	51,2	10,0	38,1	0,0	0,8	100,0
	Other alcohol	630	53,5	6,5	39,4	0,3	0,3	100,0
	School fee for boy	726	16,4	19,3	62,4	0,7	1,2	100,0
	School fee for girl	665	12,3	24,2	61,8	0,5	1,2	100,0

Number of households with this type of consumption, distributed by who decides to purchase by type of household member. Source: PeruLandGender dataset.

The second category was for more costly investments. In Table 8.2 below we find that joint decision-making is even more common. The response by both the man and woman corresponds, but their subjective perception differs in some important aspects. Men tend to see buying household plots as their decision, while women report it as a joint decision.

Table 8.2 *Household investment decisions.*

	Decision over HH Investment	HH #	Man %	Woman %	Couple %	Others %	Comb. %	All %
Quest. Man	House plot	87	48,3	6,9	40,2	1,1	3,4	100,0
	House construction	278	23,7	1,8	72,7	1,4	0,4	100,0
	House repair	342	28,9	2,0	68,1	0,3	0,6	100,0
	Furniture	280	22,5	5,7	70,4	0,7	0,7	100,0
	Buy land	90	14,4	3,3	81,1	1,1	0,0	100,0
	Sell land	7	28,6	14,3	57,1	0,0	0,0	100,0
	Machinery	17	35,3	5,9	58,8	0,0	0,0	100,0
	Car or transport	59	28,8	1,7	61,0	3,4	5,1	100,0
Quest. woman	House plot	84	15,5	8,3	75,0	1,2	0,0	100,0
	House construction	268	26,9	3,7	67,9	1,1	0,4	100,0
	House repair	323	29,4	3,4	65,9	0,3	0,9	100,0
	Furniture	279	20,8	8,2	69,5	0,7	0,7	100,0
	Buy land	91	15,4	3,3	81,3	0,0	0,0	100,0
	Sell land	5	40,0	20,0	40,0	0,0	0,0	100,0
	Machinery	8	37,5	0,0	62,5	0,0	0,0	100,0
	Car or transport	45	31,1	6,7	55,6	2,2	4,4	100,0

Number of households with this type of investment in the last five years, by who decides whether to invest or not, by type of household member. In this table *Others* refers to only non-PC people, while *Combination* can be any combination of the former categories. Source: PeruLandGender dataset.

We probed into more detailed and subtle dimensions of the decision-making process for this category. Qualitative interviews indicated that men tend to be the active part proposing investments or sales to woman who might comment and then finally give their consent. Women are not expected to come up with proposals themselves (like men have the right of initiative to propose marriage in most cultures). Our survey confirms this gender pattern. We see in Table 8.3 below that men tend to initiate nearly all such investments, and even dominate women on her own traditional domain like furniture, as 46,1 percent is above the 36,8 percent for women according to the men themselves. However, in the women's view do they decide more often at 49,8 percent, above men with 31,9 percent.

Table 8.3 *Idea of investment, by sex of respondent*

		HH	Man	Woman	Couple	Other	Comb.	Total
		#	%	%	%	%	%	%
Quest. Man	House plot	87	48,3	6,9	40,2	1,1	3,4	100,0
	House const.	278	57,9	11,2	28,1	1,8	1,1	100,0
	House repair	342	67,5	10,2	20,8	0,6	0,9	100,0
	Furniture	280	46,1	36,8	13,9	2,9	0,4	100,0
	Buy land	90	48,9	11,1	35,6	3,3	1,1	100,0
	Sell land	7	57,1	14,3	28,6	0,0	0,0	100,0
	Machinery	17	88,2	0,0	11,8	0,0	0,0	100,0
	Car/transp.	59	67,8	5,1	20,3	5,1	1,7	100,0
Quest. Woman	House plot	84	40,5	10,7	42,9	3,6	2,4	100,0
	House const.	268	51,1	15,7	31,3	0,7	1,1	100,0
	House repair	323	57,9	18,3	22,6	0,9	0,3	100,0
	Furniture	279	31,9	49,8	16,5	0,7	1,1	100,0
	Buy land	91	51,6	11,0	36,3	1,1	0,0	100,0
	Sell land	5	60,0	20,0	20,0	0,0	0,0	100,0
	Machinery	8	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0
	Car/transp.	45	64,4	11,1	13,3	8,9	2,2	100,0

The first column is the number of households in which the respondent verifies the given activity during the last five years, and the following is the percentage distribution of HH member who first came up with the idea of doing this investment. Source: PeruLandGender survey.

We also asked about specific cases of disagreement, but the respondents were reluctant to report disunity in the family. For the eight different investments in 1280 households, we only had five such cases reported by men and six by women. In further follow up questions they mostly reported the spouse to be the one disagreeing. This illustrates the problem of catching responses that are socially not acceptable in surveys as such intra household harmony is not in line with other indicators like violence.

The third category is agriculture investments and input use. Farming is traditionally dominated by men and this is reflected in the structure of decision making reported in Table 8.4 below, which indicates that the man alone decides in about 50 percent of the incidences without consulting the woman. However, the qualitative interviews also disclosed widespread consultation with the woman in agriculture. The couple normally spend the morning hours planning the day in front of them, which implies both information and discussion on the decisions to be made in the hours ahead.

Table 8.4 *Agriculture input decisions*

	Decision agri. input Purchase	HH #	Man %	Woman %	Couple %	Others %	Comb. %	All %
Quest. Man	Fertilizers	961	49,0	2,5	46,0	0,1	2,4	100,0
	Pesticides	809	48,5	1,9	46,7	0,2	2,7	100,0
	Labour hire	661	49,0	4,4	45,2	0,0	1,4	100,0
	Call work exchange	838	49,8	2,7	45,5	0,6	1,4	100,0
	Hire draft animals	653	52,1	4,1	42,9	0,0	0,9	100,0
	Tools	429	66,2	0,9	32,4	0,0	0,5	100,0
Quest. Woman	Fertilizers	960	44,8	4,0	49,4	0,2	1,7	100,0
	Pesticides	791	44,6	2,1	50,8	0,3	2,1	100,0
	Labour hire	650	43,5	6,9	48,2	0,0	1,4	100,0
	Call work exchange	766	41,9	9,1	47,3	0,5	1,2	100,0
	Hire draft animals	634	47,6	5,2	46,7	0,0	0,5	100,0
	Tools	385	62,3	1,6	34,8	0,3	1,0	100,0

Number of households with this type of agricultural input purchase, distributed by who decides whether to purchase or not by type of household member. Source: PeruLandGender survey.

Participation in the labour market is the fourth and last category. Social norms on female behaviour often hamper women's movements outside the home in many cultures and women might hence limit themselves without being explicitly prohibited by their men. The choice of labour participation can furthermore be regarded as one of the most important strategy choices for the households as a unit.

As in the preceding tables, we first report the number of positive examples within the last 12 months in the first column of Table 8.5 below. Men tend to decide by themselves as more than 70 percent of the 419 cases of outside community paid labour and 663 inside community paid labour was his decision alone. Men do influence the similar decision for women as they decided alone in 25 percent of the only 68 cases when women had paid work according to the male questionnaire response. However, the percentage is the same when women report, but the number of cases is much higher with 327 cases.



Table 8.5 *Economic activity decisions*

	Decision over economic activity	HH #	Man %	Woman %	Couple %	Others %	All %
Quest. Man	Man worked labourer outside	419	71,8	1,4	26,3	0,5	100,0
	Man worked labourer within	663	73,9	1,8	23,7	0,6	100,0
	Woman had paid work	68	32,4	25,0	42,6	0,0	100,0
	Man had paid work	229	80,8	2,2	17,0	0,0	100,0
	Woman had own business	125	12,8	44,8	41,6	0,8	100,0
	Man had own business	78	51,3	15,4	33,3	0,0	100,0
Quest. Woman	Man worked labourer outside	69	30,4	34,8	34,8	0,0	100,0
	Man worked labourer within	185	18,4	48,1	33,0	0,5	100,0
	Woman had paid work	327	73,7	3,1	22,9	0,3	100,0
	Man had paid work	45	28,9	51,1	20,0	0,0	100,0
	Woman had own business	76	23,7	46,1	30,3	0,0	100,0
	Man had own business	128	53,1	16,4	30,5	0,0	100,0

Number of households with this type of agricultural input purchase, distributed by who decides whether to purchase or not by type of household member. Source: PeruLandGender dataset.

Each subject of decision making in these four categories might reflect empowerment, i.e. the more the joint couple or woman decides alone, the more empowered she will be. Table 8.6 below gives summary indicators constructed by aggregating the responses on 26 categories<sup>14</sup> given in Tables 8.1-2 and 8.4-5. When we compare responses by gender we find that women tend to report themselves as more influential than their male counterparts portray them. According to the women themselves, 32,7 percent of them decided at least one subject alone, while the corresponding figure given by the men is only 23,0 percent. The figure given on joint decision-making is more comparable as 91,7 percent of the women and 89,1 percent of the men say she has contributed to at least one decision. Hence, only about 10 percent of the female population can be described as completely disfranchised.

In the two last lines of Table 8.6 considers we calculate the share of only the issues that had been realized in Tables 8.1-2 and 8.4-5, i.e. leaving out items that were not bought or investments, to correct for the overall consumption and activity level of the household. The share of decisions by women alone is then 10,6 percent according to themselves and 6,7 percent to the men, while the share for the couple is respectively 67,9 percent and 58,1 percent.

<sup>14</sup> Such aggregation into one empowerment variable is problematic as the subjects might actually be inversely correlated, i.e. the more empowered in one dimension the less empowered she will be in another dimension.

Table 8.6 *Summary of female empowerment in decision making*

	Woman quest.	Man quest.
Woman any decision alone, dummy and %	32,7	23,0
Woman participate in any decision, dummy and %	91,7	89,1
Number women decide alone, #	0,9	0,7
Number women participate in decision, #	5,3	5,1
Share of realized decisions by women alone, %	10,6	6,7
Share of realized decisions where women participate, %	67,9	58,1

The share of households where women decides alone in at least one of the items in Tables 8.1-2 and 8.4-5; share where she alone or together with spouse in at least one subject; number of subjects where women decide alone; number of subjects where women decide alone or jointly with spouse; share of realised decisions where women decide alone; share of realized decisions where women decide alone or jointly with spouse. The first columns are the response by the women and second by the men. Source: PeruLandGender dataset.

## 8.2 Income management

Access to household income and savings might be a prerequisite to influence on how money is spent. Gender studies have shown that men and women tend to have responsibility for separate tasks in developing countries. In poor households women often take care of household savings and expenditures while the man undertakes/is engaged in income-generating activities. Physical control of money and handling of household purchases increases her influence on how the resources are actually being spent. Living on the margin, both spouses depend on each other to obtain the highest possible consumption level. Most households in our dataset are poor made an average of 3726 soles a year, which is equal to about 1341 USD a year in nominal terms.

We applied a new and less time consuming method to estimate income in the interviews. The couple assesses total income by first indicating the relative size between different sources piling up 50 poker chips in different stacks. In a similar way, they differentiate between the contribution of the man and the woman. The respondents are then asked to estimate the main income source in monetary values, hence making it possible to anchor all other sources in monetary terms. This novel method was developed by Escobal (2009) who finds reasonable coherence between this method using relative income between sources and total income generated by asking for detailed information on each source of income.

In Table 8.7 below we see that agriculture constitutes the most important income generating activity with 42,0 percent of total income. Under activity we found that both spouses took part in agriculture, but the income figure illustrates the male dominance in agriculture as the man contributes 58,2 percent and the woman only 21,8 percent. The *Other* category is mostly the children of the household. Similarly, the female dominance over animal husbandry becomes apparent, as the women are responsible for 50,6 percent of this type of income generating activity and men considerably less with 31,5 percent.

Construction is a male activity, while women receive the monthly 100 soles from the social program Juntos. This governmental transfer make up the a considerable share of 9,5 percent of total income, and as much as 27 percent of the income attributed to women. It would be fairer to consider this family income, as the household tend to also treat it, and not income by the woman. On the other side, this calculation does not incorporate any monetary value to the household services like cooking and childcare, which tends to be the responsibility of women. This measure of contributions reflects what the respondents naturally find transferable to monetary values and hence does not reflect the whole contribution to the wellbeing of the household.

Table 8.7 *Household incomes*

Economic Activity	HH income		Man %	Woman %	Couple %	Other %	Total %
	Soles/year	%					
Agriculture	4199	42,0	58,2	21,8	0,5	19,6	100,0
Animals	2358	23,6	31,5	50,6	0,1	17,8	100,0
Trade	448	4,5	37,3	48,5	0,2	14,1	100,0
Construction	863	8,6	97,8	0,2	0,0	2,0	100,0
Cash transfer	949	9,5	0,2	99,2	0,0	0,6	100,0
Other	1175	11,8	76,1	13,2	1,5	9,2	100,0
All	9990	100,0	51,0	34,3	0,4	14,4	100,0

Mean income, both cash and in kind, by source in soles a year and percent share, then contribution by household member type. Source: PeruLandGender survey data.

Most respondents in our qualitative investigation say women tend to control the household budget. Men farm the land, but often hands over most of the products to the women. They then decide how much to consume and how much to sell at the market. There are two main ways of aggregating income to joint household consumption. You can hand over the income and then decide what to do with the money, or you make contributions towards specific consumption ends on request. In the former the individual normally asks the responsible person for household economy for money for personal expenses, while in the latter the individual is free to spend whatever is left when the requested contributions are made. To our surprise, we often found men admitting without any shame that they had to ask their wives for money to buy a soft drink or bus ticket. The latter system is more normal in migration work, which brings considerable expenses.

The household survey confirms this gender pattern of responsibility for the household economy. 68,4 percent of the women say they control the household budget, while 65,7 percent of the men says their wives are given this responsibility. The main reasons for female monetary control is that she has a better overview of the household needs and is also better informed about market prices and where/how to make good bargains. This gendered division of responsibilities for consumption and market transactions implies the woman have considerable monetary control. The result is hence a self-sustained social equilibrium where men and women have different responsibilities.

The women, however, share the right to decide with their men in 73,3 percent of the cases according to the women, but the figure for male decision making alone is minimal when compared. It might be argued that she only acts as the cashier of the household and does not have the right to decide by herself. Even seemingly independent decisions might be heavily influenced by the expected reaction of others, e.g. “my husband might beat me if he does not like my dinner”. With physical control and full information of household economy, women have a comparative advantage to men who do not necessarily have the full picture over budget constraints and available resources. This would make women more able to influence real choices than if they had no insight into the household economy.

Table 8.8 *Household budget control*

	Questionnaire Man				Questionnaire Woman			
	Controls budget		Decides budget		Controls budget		Decides budget	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Man	83	6,5	84	6,6	77	6,0	70	5,5
Woman	841	65,7	249	19,5	875	68,4	278	21,7
Couple	344	26,9	938	73,3	321	25,1	926	72,3
Other	12	0,9	9	0,7	7	0,5	6	0,5
All	1280	100	1280	100	1280	100	1280	100

Control and decision power over household budget in number and percentage for men, women, couple and other. The first four columns are numbers from a man’s individual questionnaire, and the following set of four columns are from the woman’s questionnaire. Source: PeruLandGender 2010 survey.

The survey separates between normal and incidental income. The latter derives from unforeseen windfall gains and labour opportunities. In Table 8.9 below we see that 80 percent of the men and 87 percent of the women kept less than 25 percent of their normal income to themselves, and the figures are even marginally lower for incidental income. This implies that most income is actually handed over to the household budget before the money is spent rather than each contributing the money when need for expenditure arises.

Table 8.9 *Detention of own income for individual use*

	Own normal income		Own incidental inc.	
	Man %	Woman %	Man %	Woman %
Not applicable	0,9	6,3	20,2	37,6
Don` t know	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,5
Zero (0%)	41,0	54,0	45,5	55,4
Very little (1-24 %)	39,0	32,8	37,5	30,5
Some (25%)	16,2	10,7	13,4	11,8
Half (50%)	2,9	1,5	1,8	1,2
Most (75%)	0,4	0,3	0,6	0,3
All (100%)	0,4	0,5	1,1	0,3
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

The first column depicts percentage of own income used for personal expenditure by principle man reported in the individual questionnaire and the second column reported by principle woman separately. The third and fourth column depict percentage of own incidental income used for personal expenditure by man and woman. Source: PeruLandGender 2010 survey.

There is no major discrepancy between what people report about themselves and the perception of their actions by their spouse. In Table 8.10 below we asked what they believed their partner did with their income. As we saw above, 41,0 percent of the men reported retaining nothing themselves, while 48,3 percent of their women believe their men do not keep anything themselves, hardly a major discrepancy.

Table 8.10 *Spending of partner income*

	Partner normal inc.		Partner incid. inc.	
	Man %	Woman %	Man %	Woman %
Not applicable	8,4	1,9	39,8	22,5
Don` t know	1,9	1,4	2,7	1,7
Zero (0%)	53,3	48,3	55,4	50,4
Very little (1-24 %)	32,3	33,5	30,9	30,2
Some (25%)	10,7	13,7	8,8	14,5
Half (50%)	1,3	2,1	1,3	1,8
Most (75%)	0,1	0,2	0,3	0,3
All (100%)	0,4	0,8	0,6	1,0
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

The first column depicts percentage of partner income used for personal expenditure by the principle man reported in the individual questionnaire and the second column reported by principle woman separately. The third and fourth column depict percentage of partner incidental income used for personal expenditure by man and woman. Source: PeruLandGender 2010 survey.

A more objective way of measuring economic responsibility is the name(s) of the bank accounts holder(s). As seen by the total numbers, this service is still not widely in use by the peasant population even though there are several branches in each department. In Table 8.11 below we see in the first line that according to men, only 35 households have such accounts, and that it would typically be registered in the name of both, the man alone and only 22,9 percent to the women alone. The latter number increases to 27,6 percent for female respondents.

Table 8.11 *Banking decisions*

	Economic responsibility	Obs. #	Man %	Woman %	Couple %	Other %	Total %
Quest. Man	Bank account	35	37,1	22,9	40,0	0,0	100,0
	Responsible cash	1264	6,6	66,5	26,3	0,6	100,0
	Decide HH expenditure	1254	6,7	19,9	72,9	0,6	100,0
Quest. Woman	Bank account	29	24,1	27,6	48,3	0,0	100,0
	Responsible cash	1270	6,1	68,9	24,8	0,2	100,0
	Decide HH expenditure	1258	5,6	22,1	71,9	0,4	100,0

The first column is the number of such HH that report given money management type, while the following are the distribution of type of HH member category with this management type. Source: PeruLandGender survey.

The Deere (1991) study looked at how male labor migration led to a breakdown in income pooling, which were high when agriculture constituted the main income generating activity in Cajamarca in the north of the country. As households became more dependent on wage income, which was only earned by men, the tendency was for income pooling to break down. Men started to give only 'the *gasto*' to women, i.e. household expenditure and to keep discretionary income for themselves. We do not find such a reduction in female financial control in our sample, which is mainly from the southern Quecha-speaking regions.

### 8.3 Credit

The 1280 households signed only 210 loans and the respondents only gave information for such successful applications. In the first column of Table 8.12 we find that men requested more loans alone than women, but this figure decreases for receiving and finally signing the contract which in 50,5 percent of the cases is done jointly.

Table 8.12 *Credit*

	Requested loan		Receive loan		Sign contract		Soles received
	#	%	#	%	#	%	
Man	71	33,8	65	31,0	35	16,7	4003
Woman	43	20,5	44	21,0	22	10,5	2656
Couple	87	41,4	84	40,0	106	50,5	3141
Other	9	4,3	17	8,1	47	22,4	?
Total	210	100,0	210	100,0	210	100,0	3339

The first column shows who in the household has requested a loan in number, and the second shows the percentage of all requesting a loan. Column four and five shows who received a loan, both in number within type and as percentage of all who receive. Column five and six show who signed the contract in number and percentage of all and the last column depicts mean amount in Soles granted by man, woman and couple. Source: PeruLandGender 2010 survey.

Furthermore, most lenders have put up some form of collateral in 114 of the 210 cases even though the lending institutions in rural areas say they do not foreclose in case of default. Land is commonly used as collateral as the lending institutions use it as a proxy of income and hence ability to pay back the loan. In Table 8.13 below we find that women use individual land as collateral in 20,2 percent of the cases while jointly owned land is used in 47,4 percent of the cases.

Table 8.13 *Collateral*

	Land		House		Other		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Man	37	32,5	8	26,7	13	43,3	58	33,3
Woman	23	20,2	7	23,3	7	23,3	37	21,3
Couple	54	47,4	15	50,0	10	33,3	79	45,4
All	114	100	30	100	30	100	174	100

Depicts the security used in order to obtain the loan. The first two columns show the number and percentage that used land as security, by type, i.e. man, woman and couple jointly. The fourth and fifth columns show number and percentage using the house and the last two columns show the number and percentage of other forms of security used. Source: PeruLandGender 2010 survey.

## 8.4 Other empowerment indicator

We define empowerment as the ability to influence decision-making within the household in Tables 8.2-8.7. The previous discussion discloses that such influence varies between types of decisions.

We also collected other information that reflects the woman's level of influence and self determination. The responses on physical and verbal/psychological violence are reported in Table 8.14 below. 16,4 percent of the women had suffered from physical violence and 28,1 percent psychological or verbal violence in their lives, while the corresponding figures for men is lower with 7,7 and 13,1 percent, respectively. We see that women report their spouses to be the perpetrator in 82,9 percent of the physical abuse and 87,2 percent of the verbal/psychological cases of violence.

Table 8.14 *Violence*

		Cases #	Man %	Woman %	Other %
Man	Physical	49	14,3	14,3	71,4
	Verbal	84	6,0	42,9	51,2
Woman	Physical	105	82,9	1,0	16,2
	Verbal	180	87,2	0,6	12,2

The number and percent of men and women who report having suffered from physical and/or verbal violence anytime in their lives, and then whether the perpetrator was a man, a woman or someone else. Source: PeruLandGender 2010 survey.

Men mostly report outsiders as the perpetrator. They are hence probably referring to experiences, especially during the years of civil conflict, between the state and the guerrilla organisation Shining Path. The 14,3 and 6,0 percent for man and 1,0 and 6,0 percent for women of self reporting is probably due to misunderstanding by either the respondent or the enumerator).

In Table 8.15 below we see that 15,9 percent of these women had reported the physical violence to the police, while as many as 64,5 percent did not react in any way. It is even less common to seek help in cases of verbal/psychological violence as the latter figure rises to 79,0 percent. However, not even violence is a uniform measure of empowerment. In panel group discussions women told us that if the men come home drunk and beat them, they would be very compliant in subsequent days and let the women decide in most issues. They also perceived men who beat their wife while drunk as weak since they had no other ways of dominating their wife. Therefore, a violence empowerment indicator might be inversely correlated with a decision empowerment indicator.

Most respondents experiencing violence do not report or ask for help, i.e. 65 percent of the women and 71 percent of the male cases do “nothing” if they experience physical violence. If they do, reporting to the police is actually more common than trying to involve the family.



Table 8.15 *Response to abuse*

Response to abuse	Physical violence				Verbal violence			
	Woman		Man		Woman		Man	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Attendance from family	8	7,5	1	2,0	7	3,9	1	1,2
Attendance from acq.	2	1,9	0	0,0	2	1,1	0	0,0
Reported to judge	8	7,5	0	0,0	8	4,4	0	0,0
Reported to police	17	15,9	9	18,4	17	9,4	5	6,0
Help organization	1	0,9	0	0,0	1	0,6	0	0,0
Hit back	2	1,9	3	6,1	3	1,7	0	0,0
Nothing	69	64,5	35	71,4	143	79,0	74	88,1
Other	0	0,0	1	2,0	0	0,0	4	4,8
Total	107	100,0	49	100,0	181	100,0	84	95,2

Individual questionnaire responses by men and women to whether they have experienced physical and psychological violence in their lifetime, and then how they reacted to this violence. Multiple responses possible. Source: PeruLandGender survey.

## 8.5 Norms

Differences in decision-making power between spouses tend to come to light in stressed situations. When a couple lives together, all property might be perceived as jointly owned and decisions made by both in harmony. However, if quarrels begin, each part might put more emphasis on actually coming through with their own view. Separation and divorce is not an uncommon phenomenon as 39,1 percent of the men and 38,2 percent of the women know about such cases, see Table 8.16 below. However, only 1,7 percent of the men and 2,8 percent of the women admit they are separated or divorced themselves.

Table 8.16 *Knowledge of separation*

	Man quest.		Woman quest.	
	#	%	#	%
Knowledge of couples separating	500	39,1	489	38,2
The separated is myself	20	1,7	34	2,8
The separated is within the family	180	15,0	198	16,5
The separated is within the community?	362	30,2	341	28,4
The separated is outside the community?	282	23,5	250	20,8
The separated is within the district?	157	13,1	109	9,1
The separated is outside the district?	100	8,3	63	5,3

If man and woman know of any cases of couples separating, and if yes, which cases do they know. Source: PeruLandGender survey

In order to map general norms we asked men and women separately about their perceptions on property rights and other issues in the hypothetical case of a young couple who settled together. The basic condition is that the parents of the young man gave a parcel so they would have something to live off. We purposely used a neutral formulation in order to avoid indicating the actual receiver(s). In Table 8.17 below we find that both men and women distinguish between married and cohabitating young couples when it comes to property right to this land. This reflects that cohabitating is often considered a trial period before they announce their partnership to the rest of the community through marriage (Bolton 2010).

85,7 percent of the men consider the land to be joint property and only 12,3 percent to be the property of the man alone if the young couple is married. The former falls to 51,6 percent and the latter rises to 40,7 percent if the young couple are only cohabitating. In our sample, about 2/3 of the principal couples, while 1/3 cohabiting (see table A2 in appendix). Women give similar responses in the lower part of Table 8.15. This difference in perception is important as PETT indiscriminately enforced joint ownership on married and cohabitating couples. Hence, this contradicts the social norms and perceptions for a large share of the rural population. It further has real consequences as the women will have a legal right to half the land if the young couple decides to split after a short time.

We further see that men dominate agriculture, even though couple decision is still the main norm. An interesting observation is that men tend to decide whether to sell in large quantities, 15,9 percent indicates the men and only 1,9 percent the women, while the opposite is the case for smaller quantities with 8 percent men and 28 percent women. However, women are relatively more active when it comes to the actual marketing of products. Family planning is a joint matter, while the women have more to say in the choice of contraception method.

Table 8.17 *Gender norms in household*

		Norms	Man	Woman	Couple	Others	All
			%	%	%	%	%
Q u e s t i o n	M a n	If married, who is the owner of the parcel?	12,3	1,8	85,7	0,2	100,0
		If cohabitants, who is the owner of the parcel?	40,7	3,6	51,6	4,1	100,0
		Who decides what to cultivate on the parcel?	28,5	0,9	70,5	0,1	100,0
		Who decides how to sell in bulk from the parcel?	15,9	1,9	82,0	0,2	100,0
		And who sells?	25,9	14,7	59,2	0,2	100,0
		Who decides how to sell kilos of the parcel?	8,3	27,5	64,1	0,1	100,0
		And who sells?	13,9	43,6	42,2	0,3	100,0
		Who should decide if use contraception?	4,0	4,1	91,8	0,2	100,0
		Who should decide the method of contraception?	3,7	21,0	75,2	0,2	100,0
		Who should decide the number of children ?	3,1	3,3	93,0	0,6	100,0
n a i r e	W o m a n	If married, who is the owner of the parcel?	11,6	2,5	85,8	0,2	100,0
		If cohabitants, who is the owner of the parcel?	38,0	4,6	55,2	2,3	100,0
		Who decides what to cultivate on the parcel?	21,3	2,3	76,4	0,0	100,0
		Who decides how to sell in bulk from the parcel?	12,2	4,3	83,4	0,1	100,0
		And who sells?	19,7	19,3	60,9	0,1	100,0
		Who decides how to sell kilos of the parcel?	5,9	30,9	63,2	0,1	100,0
		And who sells?	8,3	49,4	42,3	0,0	100,0
		Who should decide if use contraception?	2,4	7,0	90,2	0,3	100,0
		Who should decide the method of contraception?	1,8	24,8	73,2	0,2	100,0
		Who should decide the number of children ?	1,8	6,4	91,6	0,2	100,0

Individual questionnaire for men and women on how they expect certain described young couple to behave. Source: PeruLandGender survey data.

We expected women to be more passive in the public sphere than men. However, the respondents tended to regard that both the man and the woman in the young couple had the right to take part in public decision making. In Table 8.18 below we see that they are both expected to be able to express their opinion in community assemblies and that men are only marginally more expected to take leadership positions during their lives. However, such spaces might be divided by gender, e.g. men dominating the general assembly of the community while women dominate the female organisation of food handouts and communal kitchen.

Table 8.18 *Gender norms in public behaviour*

	Norms	Yes %	No %	D. know %	All %
Quest. Man	Can a man express his opinion in an assembly?	99.0	0.8	0.2	100
	Can a woman express his opinion in an assembly?	96.9	2.5	0.6	100
	Will a man at a certain age have had a community post?	90.4	9.2	0.4	100
	Will a woman at a certain age have had a community post?	85.0	13.6	1.4	100
Quest. Woman	Can a man express his opinion in an assembly?	98.6	0.8	0.6	100
	Can a woman express his opinion in an assembly?	95.4	3.2	1.4	100
	Will a man at a certain age have had a community post?	87.9	11.5	0.6	100
	Will a woman at a certain age have had a community post?	80.3	18.0	1.7	100

Norms of appropriate behaviour of a man and a woman in public, in separate individual questionnaires for men and women. Source: PeruLandGender survey.

Internal relations between spouses is not easily observable in public. However, in some Andean cultures the man was traditionally expected to walk in front of his spouse on the street or footpath. The majority of respondents said that they should walk side by side, but as many as 15,8 percent of the men and 13,6 percent of the women said the man should walk in front. Few said the women should walk in front of the man.

Most interesting is the perception of property right to land in case of separation. We posed the original case that the man's parents were the original donors. Then 45,3 percent of the men and 40,6 percent of the women said the man would get the land alone, as seen in Table 8.19 below. Then we raised a hypothetical case where the parcel was transferred from the woman's parents instead. The figure rises to 57,3 percent of the men and 58,7 percent of the women say the land should belong to her alone in case of divorce. This illustrates that the perception of joint ownership does not necessarily apply if the couple breaks apart. However, if the land was bought together, the respondents clearly state that the property should be split when marriage or co-habitation ends.

Table 8.19 *Land ownership after separation*

Ownership right over parcel if a couple separates and the parcel is ...		Total #	Man %	Woman %	Joint %	Others %
Quest. Man	received from man's parents	1280	45,3	7,3	30,9	16,4
	received from woman's parents	1280	2,8	57,3	24,2	15,6
	bought together	1280	1,9	6,6	81,6	9,8
Quest. Woman	received from man's parents	1280	40,6	13,3	30,2	15,9
	received from woman's parents	1280	2,7	58,7	24,2	14,4
	bought together	1280	0,9	9,2	80,4	9,5

Subjective perception of who would be the owner of a given parcel in case a young couple separated dependent on how acquired it, by individual questionnaires for men and women. Source: PeruLandGender survey.

How land is actually split in case of separation or divorce will also depend on what happened in the given situation, both due to what the couple think is right in the given situation and cultural norms given in the society at large. Qualitative interviews indicate that land is also transferred to their children, though controlled by the person with custody over the children, i.e. normally the woman. The survey figures clearly demonstrate this position. Ninety-six percent of the women and 94 percent of the men say the custodian should keep the land. A rather high figure, 66 percent of the women and 69 percent of the men, also says a woman has the right to expel bad behaving husbands from the home, while she would not keep anything if she chooses to leave herself according to 60 percent of the women and 55 percent of the men. Qualitative interviews also suggest she would then also risk losing the children.

## 8.6 Activities by gender

Responsibility for tasks and activities is divided by gender in the Peruvian highland as illustrated in Table 8.20 below. The women alone or together with some person other than the spouse take care of the home, i.e. weaving, cooking, cleaning and children, as well as the animals. The man's responsibility is to bring monetary income to the house and represent the family in work exchange and public work. Both men and women do however take part in farming, but the men have probably more responsibility as indicated in the income figures given in the previous analysis.

Table 8.20 *Division of household activity*

Household activity	HH #	Woman Alone %	Man alone %	Couple alone %	Others %	Woman w/other %	Man w/other %	Couple w/other %	Total %
Cooking	1275	37,8	0,2	15,5	2,8	31,6	0,4	11,6	100
Cleaning dishes	1276	33,0	0,3	11,0	5,0	36,4	0,3	14,0	100
Cleaning clothes	1271	35,6	0,2	14,9	5,1	31,3	0,3	12,5	100
Weaving	804	74,8	1,2	2,2	3,9	16,3	0,1	1,5	100
Nursing children	671	34,3	0,0	37,3	3,1	11,5	0,0	13,9	100
Nursing elders	128	21,9	2,3	42,2	9,4	7,8	0,8	15,6	100
Collecting pasture	1073	8,4	6,6	33,3	9,9	7,5	2,9	31,4	100
Collecting wood	1262	1,7	21,2	29,1	8,6	2,4	8,0	29,2	100
Collecting water	894	11,5	3,7	32,7	12,6	6,7	1,0	31,8	100
Animals to pasture	1145	9,3	3,0	28,3	9,7	12,8	2,2	34,8	100
Milking	475	44,0	4,0	26,3	3,8	9,9	1,1	10,9	100
Feeding animals	915	29,5	5,1	27,8	5,5	10,8	1,4	19,9	100
Fertilize	1206	0,5	19,1	21,2	6,2	0,9	19,4	32,7	100
Sow	1278	0,0	8,5	13,3	7,6	0,7	14,4	55,6	100
Herbs	1271	0,4	16,4	25,5	9,7	1,4	8,9	37,8	100
Irrigate	975	0,3	32,2	24,3	5,3	0,7	11,8	25,3	100
Harvest	1275	0,0	5,1	14,0	8,2	0,9	9,0	62,7	100
Transport	764	20,7	15,7	47,1	2,1	1,4	4,3	8,6	100
Store	1081	1,3	15,7	43,1	7,1	1,1	3,5	28,1	100
Grinding	1039	37,0	5,4	28,9	6,0	9,4	1,0	12,4	100
Ayni/minka	965	1,9	46,4	39,3	2,4	0,1	4,2	5,7	100
Salary in community	576	1,2	78,0	13,2	2,1	0,0	4,5	1,0	100
Salary outside com.	348	0,6	85,9	5,7	3,4	0,0	4,0	0,3	100
Own business	167	9,6	70,1	13,8	3,0	0,6	1,8	1,2	100

The first column is the number of households performing different household activities. Then follows persons responsible for the task in percent: (i) the man alone, (ii) the woman alone, (iii) couple alone, (iv) other, (v) woman with other household member, (vi) man with other household member or (vii) couple with other household member. Source: PeruLandGender survey.

Men tend to participate more in public life than women, but the gender gap is not as large as the qualitative interviews indicate. In Table 8.21 below we see that considerably more men have entered the committees organising work and responsibilities within the community, e.g. 33,6 percent men in self defence compared to 19,1 percent for women or 57,8 percent men and 35,6 percent women in irrigation. The women on their side take part in the mother's club, but such activity is not as inclusive as expected since only 51,4 percent takes part. There are no major differences in religious affiliation.

Table 8.21 *Public participation*

Participation	Men	Women
	%	%
Community assembly	89,9	79,2
Self-defence committee	33,6	19,1
Irrigation committee	57,8	35,6
Club for mothers	9,3	51,4
Political party	19,5	9,7
Catholic church	66,2	62,6
Other church	26,6	30,7
Scholl parents' organisation	62,1	63,1
Other organisation	7,3	20,8

Participation in different organisations, by individual questionnaires for men and women. Source: PeruLandGender survey.

## 8.7 Community questionnaire

Our study also includes survey interviews with the president of the community or another key informant on major gender and organisational aspects. Nearly all communities, CCR as well as CP, hold general assemblies to discuss matters that affect their inhabitants. Most households would then normally be represented. The assembly keeps records listing all households, election results and decisions reached. The community elects their own president, but the state district governor selects his representative in the community, although this person is normally first recommended by the community assembly. Committees elected in the assembly then organise irrigation, maintenance of the drinking water piping system and other important public offices. More than half of the communities still organise self-defence committees, even though the Shining Path guerrillas were defeated in the early 1990s.

Table 8.22 *Positions and committees in community*

Community offices	%
Governor's representative	95,8
President of community	84,5
Committee for irrigation	67,6
Committee for water	88,7
Committee for self-defence	49,3
Other committees	35,2

Share of the 71 communities in survey with different types of committees and positions of responsibilities. Source: PeruLandGender survey.

Women were seldom elected to higher important positions in the community. The only exception in Table 8.23 below is leadership of the mother's club, which is an all-women organisation. The explanation given in the few cases of female presidents was that men had lost interest in the community assembly, i.e. disintegrating communities.

Table 8.23 *Position of women in community*

Community has had female leader	%
President	7,1
Committee president	9,9
Governor's representative	12,7
Leader of Mothers club	69,0
Peace judge	1,4
Other leadership position	39,4

Share of 69 communities that have had women in different positions during the last five years. Source: PeruLandGender survey.

A principal assumption in the impact analysis is that all communities within a district had comparable cultures before individual titling took place. In the qualitative interviews we find that the community assembly put considerable restrictions on individual behaviour through "internal laws". We find internal laws to be more common in the former with 92,1 percent of the respondents said at least one type of restriction was in place while the corresponding figure for the latter is 51,5 percent. However, even individually internalized norms of behaviour might replace explicitly formulated internal laws based on the same norms. In the Apurimac department we found that individual owners with PETT titles were expected to sell to other community members for a "decent" and then only offer to outsiders if none of the fellow community members were interested. Among these communities with internal laws, 52 percent say they cannot transfer to people outside the family, 35 percent say they can't transfer to people outside the community and only 13 percent say there is no restriction on transfers. It hence seems like one of the main purposes of internal laws is to restrict sales to outsiders.

Such internal laws might be recorded in different ways. Table 8.24 below gives an account of the multiple choices as reported by key informants in the community. Normally such internal laws are written down in the community assembly records, but many also take them to the public registry to increase their legal weight. Qualitative interviews indicate community members make precedence of the former in cases when internal and formal laws conflict.

Table 8.24 *Internal laws*

	Inform-ally %	Com. Records %	Munici-pality %	Public registry %	Other %
CCR	41,7	83,3	25,0	52,8	5,6
CP	33,3	45,5	12,1	18,2	3,0

The share of CCR and CP communities with internal laws registered in a given way, multiple choices. Source: PeruLandGender survey.

In Table 8.25 below we asked the presidents or key informant to distinguish between lands held in possession (mainly CCR) and registered property (mainly CP).



Table 8.25 *Internal community law restrictions by community type*

Restrictions in...	Possession %	Property %
Use of land when want	23,7	12,1
Lay land idle	26,3	15,2
Expel others who want to farm the land	5,3	9,1
Expel others who want to graze animals on the land	7,9	6,1
Select type of crop	21,1	3,0
Lend the land to others	28,9	9,1
Rent the land to others for money	13,2	9,1
Sell the land to others within the community	15,8	6,1
Sell the land to others outside the community	28,9	15,2
Sell the land at any price	36,8	15,2

The share of all CCR and CP communities that has some explicit restriction in internal laws the following type of individual activity. Source: PeruLandGender survey.

## 9 Conclusions

This methodological and descriptive report of the PeruLandGender household survey collected in late 2010 covers a range of issues. The statistical summary results describe important features of the gender culture and land property rights in poor highland peasant communities, features that will be investigated more thoroughly in separate articles using econometric methods and further illustrated with qualitative data from in-depth interviews on each issue.

The material makes it possible to draw some tentative conclusions. Women take considerable part in household decision-making within the household. Regarding unilateral decisions, 32,7 percent of the women have decided unilaterally on one of the 26 subjects asked about in the survey, and have made such decisions alone or together with spouse in 91,7 percent of the households. That leaves less than 10 percent of the women disenfranchised. When we only consider the realised decisions cases, we find that women, according to their own accounts, take part in 67,9 percent. Her influence is lowest in agriculture and decisions to take part in salaried work, both of which are the main responsibility of the man. However, being included in decision-making does not necessarily imply gender equality in all aspects. We found for example that men normally initiated ideas for large investments and then consulted their spouses, seldom the other way around. The distinction between joint decision-making and being consulted is subtle, but potentially very important when it comes to women's ability to actually influence their own life.

The idea of an active and passive partner is contrary when it comes to management of income. The majority of both men and women leave more than 75 percent of their income to a common household budget, money that is controlled by the women alone in nearly 70 percent of the households. Even though she will normally have to consult her husband, this physical control probably implies considerable influence over how the money is being spent. Women are also economically active in other dimensions, e.g. has her name on 63 percent of the bank accounts of the household. They also requested and signed more than 60 percent of the loans, either alone or together with their husbands.

Both men and women report taking part in agriculture, but the woman only attribute 22 percent of the income from this source to be her contribution. This reflects a division of labour, which still implies that the man is the main agriculturalist. However, land is subjectively perceived to be jointly owned by the man and the woman in 85 percent of the parcels that belong to at least one of the household members. The share of the PETT titled parcels with joint ownership is actually lower at 76 percent. However, this is not caused by a disproportional redistribution between the spouses, but rather due to an increase in the *Other* category. It turns out

that older parents often remain the formal owner even if the land is defacto transferred to the younger generation. Women also inherit considerable amounts of land, in value about half the amount that men inherit. Even inherited land is perceived as jointly owned for 76 percent of the value. This illustrates that joint ownership introduced formally through the PETT process is probably consistent with pre-existing popular perceptions of ownership to land when a man and woman come together to form a couple. However, they distinguish between being married and only being co-habitants, as 85 percent say the norm is joint ownership in the former and only 52 percent in the latter. Furthermore, even if they own land jointly, only 24 percent say they should share inherited land in case of divorce as the majority thinks land should be given to the inheritor. This is a stark contrast to land bought while they still were a couple of which 80 percent of the respondents say should be split between the two parties, implicitly without regarding who actually earned the money to buy the land in the first place.

The PETT practise of issuing joint titling is hence consistent with pre-existing practises amongst existing couples and hence partly explains why this redistribution of assets between sexes has been so easily accepted by the public and adapted in practise by the population. It is hence still in question whether an introduction of joint property to land will be as successful in other countries with a more individualistic property culture. Furthermore, it constitutes a break with both tradition and the Peruvian civil code, which states that inheritance is considered individual property in case of separation and divorce.

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# Appendix 1

## Tables

	N Titling PTRT 1	N Joint Title PTRT 1	N Titling PTRT 2	N Joint Title PTRT 2	% Joint Titling PTRT1	% joint Titling PTRT 2
National	1 061 666	472 200	447 151	256 542	44 %	57 %
CAJAMARCA	259 271	81 392	85 612	53 988	31 %	63 %
LA LIBERTAD	41 386	22 127	66 222	37 216	53 %	56 %
PUNO	58 858	41 784	57 732	34 898	71 %	60 %
JUNIN	26 916	14 482	32 777	18 708	54 %	57 %
APURIMAC	38 225	23 878	23 810	14 725	62 %	62 %
HUANUCO	12 474	666	23 116	11 689	5 %	51 %
AYACUCHO	75 947	38 780	22 110	11 336	51 %	51 %
ANCASH	294 358	110 783	20 134	11 212	38 %	56 %
CUSCO	25 446	14 943	18 204	9 371	59 %	51 %
AREQUIPA	56 004	31 673	12 796	8 713	57 %	68 %
HUANCAVELICA	1 290	158	12 098	8 134	12 %	67 %
LAMBAYEQUE	28 444	14 587	11 167	4 369	51 %	39 %
AMAZONAS	20 997	11 706	10 426	5 938	56 %	57 %
UCAYALI	2	2	10 057	5 522	100 %	55 %
PIURA	22 112	14 732	9 834	6 221	67 %	63 %
LIMA	14 060	4 567	7 853	3 542	32 %	45 %
SAN MARTIN	27 947	15 866	7 121	3 975	57 %	56 %
PASCO	6 080	3 278	6 984	3 417	54 %	49 %
LORETO	400	33	3 660	1 024	8 %	28 %
ICA	25 081	12 240	1 589	721	49 %	45 %
TUMBES	4 296	2 313	1 582	783	54 %	49 %
MADRE d DIOS	2 108	1 152	1 024	439	55 %	43 %
MOQUEGUA	13 828	7 736	822	398	56 %	48 %
TACNA	6 129	3 321	396	197	54 %	50 %
CALLAO	7	1	25	6	14 %	24 %

**Table A1. Joint ownership in COFOPRI cadastre:** Calculated share of parcels with joint title in the COFOPRI cadastre from rural areas, split between the first phase of the PETT titling effort 1996-2000 (PTRT1) and second phase 2002-2006 (PTRT2), by department. Source: COFOPRI cadastre 2010.

Marital status	Man quest.		Woman quest.	
	#	%	#	%
Married	811	63,4	808	63,1
Cohabitant	469	36,6	472	36,9
All	1280	100,0	1280	100,0

**Table A2. Marital status:** The number and share of principal couples of the household that are married and cohabit, answers given in the respectively man and women individual questionnaire, Source: PeruLandGender survey.

	HH #	Man %	Woman %	Couple %	None %
Man below 25 years	35	42,9	8,6	42,9	2,0
Man between 25 and 40 years	396	33,1	12,1	51,3	3,5
Man between 40 and 60 years	555	26,9	12,6	55,0	5,6
Man above 60 years	262	17,6	13,0	60,7	8,8
All	1280	27,1	12,6	54,5	5,8

**Table A3. Native community:** Number and per cent of households living in the native community of (i) only the man, (ii) only the woman, (iii) of both PP, or (iv) of neither the man nor woman. Source: PeruLandGender survey.