



Unintended Effects in Evaluations of Norwegian Aid

A desk study

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Norad

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A desk study

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Norwegian Institute of Urban and Regional Research (NIBR)

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Note on layout and language

The layout of the document conforms to guidelines for accessibility and ease of reading, which require Arial font and left (not full) justification of the text.


Preface

Evaluations typically ask for the results of a development intervention. This would usually be interpreted as the *intended* results. However, aid also leads to *unintended* effects, positive and negative. This is recognized in the evaluation criteria laid out by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD, where the definition of “results” encompasses both intended and unintended results. This way, an assessment of results should capture a rather broad spectrum of results of development cooperation. While those in charge of aid management are normally only required to report on achievement of planned results, evaluations may supplement results documentation by investigating the unintended effects to contribute to a balanced view on the effects of aid.

This study looks into how previous evaluations have covered unintended effects of aid, with the purpose of suggesting ways in which such effects can be better addressed by the aid management. According to the report, unintended effects are asked for in almost half of the evaluation mandates. The study observes that when the evaluators come across unintended effects, these are relatively minor in nature, rarely followed by much analysis. Nevertheless, the report contains several examples of how unintended effects can be included in evaluations, providing us with important lessons when planning for new interventions as well as new evaluations.

The first part of this study provides an introduction to the issue of unintended effects, including a theoretical discussion of the concept per se and a brief overview of research on the issue. Then the findings are presented, followed by a summary of the main observations, as well as conclusions and recommendations.

We hope that this study can bring greater awareness of possible unintended effects, an aspect of development cooperation which in our opinion serves due attention.



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
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Acronyms

CSO	Civil Society Organisation
Danida	Danish International Development Agency
DFID	Department for International Development
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
Logframe	Logical Framework Approach
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NORCAP	Norwegian Capacity, the Norwegian Refugee Council's emergency standby roster
Norfund	Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OECD/DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SIA	Social Impact Assessment
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

Main Report



1. Introduction

Those responsible for development aid are increasingly concerned about producing documentary evidence of the results. Executors of aid projects and programmes are provided with result-focused tools, and all activities are routinely evaluated. Considerable efforts are made to identify effects that are in line with plans – but less attention is paid to possible side-effects that were not intended as one of our main results. This is unfortunate, for at least two reasons. Firstly, it means that aid may cause harm that is not discovered in time to enable adjustment. Secondly, with positive but unintended effects, the aid management system may miss out on opportunities to facilitate more such effects.

This study has been commissioned by Norad's Evaluation Department in order to shed light on what extent, and how, aid evaluations identify unintended effects. The study also discusses lessons to be drawn from the findings, and how they could be used to improve the aid management system.

According to the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria (2010), evaluations must search openly for all types of effects, intended as well as unintended (both positive and negative). As argued below, development aid is often about facilitating the *by-effects* that can emerge as a result of outputs and outcomes. Such by-effects are not easily predicted, however.

Development aid is conducted in settings that are complex and non-transparent, also for experienced aid workers. The risk of causing negative unintended effects is real. This awareness is reflected in the World Bank's policy aimed at minimising any environmental and social damage that might be caused by its lending operations, summed up as the 'do-no-harm' principle. One basic reason why aid might have unintended negative effects is that it brings financial resources, goods and services into settings where even modest material stimuli often attract great interest. Important agents may risk focusing on appropriating the stimuli rather than on the objectives that those stimuli are meant to promote, e.g. 'rent-seeking' in various forms. Moreover, aid may 'absorb' strategically important, active and innovative local individuals for project work, pulling them out of the real-life settings where they otherwise might have established useful businesses or political initiatives. The risk that development aid may lead to unintended effects is probably reduced if the management system is well-versed in analysing power issues and conflicts. The present study is based on an analysis of evaluations commissioned by Norad's Evaluation Department, as well as several evaluations made for other donor agencies.

2. What are unintended effects?

Here we discuss the concept of unintended effects with reference to two main sources: the scholarly literature; and practical guidelines prepared for the development aid sector, based on the OECD/DAC criteria.

Robert K. Merton's 'The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action' (1936) is a classical treatise of unintended consequences. Although not the first to discuss such effects, he was the first to popularize the term. His article stressed that every planned action that manipulates human behaviour will have unanticipated effects, although not necessarily undesirable ones. Merton distinguished three main types of unanticipated effects: (i) positive unexpected effects; (ii) negative and detrimental effects which occur in addition to anticipated ones; and (iii) perverse effects – effects counter to what was planned or anticipated. Further, he identifies several types of such effects according to their source:

- Unanticipated effects may stem from ignorance, indicating that context-related variables affect the intended outcomes and impacts. Assumptions are an important aspect, as erroneous assumptions will mean that contextual differences will influence the results.
- The 'imperious immediacy of interest' refers to instances when agents are more concerned with immediate effects (short-term outcomes), they will lose sight of other effects that may be of equal long-term importance. With the increasing focus on results-based management of interventions, this may be a highly relevant factor for development aid.

Although development aid is not among the specific examples given, Jon Elster's (1985) approach to unintended effects is worth noting. He refers to 'willing what cannot be willed' (1985:45). One of the types of irrationality he identifies is the direct intention to bring about mental or social states that are essentially by-products of actions undertaken for other ends. For instance, planning for something to be 'natural' or 'spontaneous' does not work: it can only occur as an unintended effect.

Development aid seeks to achieve states/conditions that are by-products. Some of them are intended, but some of them cannot be 'willed', to use Elster's expression. They must come about as by-products: they will appear only if other goals is the prime focus.

Elster (1985: 97) refers to John Stuart Mill, who held that the main effect of a political system is to develop public character and spirit. Elster disagrees because, as he sees it, the educational quality of politics depends on its 'business end'. People learn from engaging in politics only if it is for real, as when important outcomes are at stake. This is an important point. At times, development aid risks becoming 'socio-technocratic' and a-political, ignoring the driving forces (like conflict) that lead to the desired by-products. For instance, tripartite cooperation in industry came as a result of the parties' wish to structure conflict in a non-destructive way. This aspect may be difficult to introduce directly from outside as a project, and not a compromise – without acknowledging conflict.

Example of 'planning to be spontaneous' abound in the field of development aid. For instance, a vibrant and genuine civil society cannot emerge as result of direct undertakings 'to build civil society'. It will emerge only if people join together and set up associations to work and fight for influence, self-government, new legislation, workplace rights, etc. Primarily as the 'fruits' of these efforts can strong institutions, democratic practices etc. be established. As Elster (1985:54) points out, using an example from therapy, the final goal is not realized instrumentally through the intermediate state of becoming aware, but as a by-product of bringing about that state. An analogy in developmental aid to 'intermediate states' would be 'outcomes'. Thus, it is essential to focus on the by-products: the *unintended effects*.

Returning to the literature on unintended effects and aid, mention should be made of James Ferguson's 'The Anti-Politics Machine' (1994) regarding development interventions in Lesotho. The article discusses the side-effects of the failed intervention. In Ferguson's opinion, however, whether the intervention is defined as failure or success is less relevant than registering the actual effects. He cites the example of new roads in Lesotho. The project intention had been to facilitate the sale of cattle. In fact, no increase in sales resulted, because cattle are used as a savings device. However, people living in distant rural communities became more connected, and could gain increased influence on local politics (Ferguson, 1994; 180). The failure or success of an intervention depends on the perspective of the observer.

A good summary of the literature on unintended effects in development aid is provided by Tina M. J. Newby's 'Unintended Effects of Development Aid' (Newby, 2010), which is fairly specific in identifying unintended effects in reviewing several studies and other literature.

The concept of *Dutch disease* originates from economics. The term refers to instances when large windfalls appreciate the exchange rate of a country, making it difficult for competitive markets in that country to sell relatively expensive goods in the international market, leading to stagnation in domestic growth. *Fungibility* is another concept that features in connection with foreign aid. Fungibility means that, when local communities or governments receive aid for specific purposes, this creates an opportunity for the local governments to replace their own funding within the relevant sector with outside aid. That

enables the beneficiaries to divert the use of own funds to other sectors, e.g. from health to roads – or to the military, or higher wages for government employees. However, fungibility is very difficult to attribute to interventions or aid flows, as Newby notes.

As to the effects on local institutions, Newby shows that aid may alter the existing systems and relationships between and within institutions, civil society and the government. Rent-seeking behaviour and corruption are examples of such possible effects. The extent of such effects depends on the absorption capacity of the recipient country: after a certain amount of projects or interventions within a country, the local government or financial systems cannot absorb further resources productively.

Lastly Newby incorporates a similar discussion as Ferguson, included in the concept of social effects. She underscores the importance of contexts and perceptions as heavily influencing the success or failure of interventions. Social effects are dependent on existing relationships between local beneficiaries. Within or between institutions and communities there are webs of power relations that may often not achieve full acceptance among with planners or with beneficiaries. The actual effects of an intervention may be deemed successful by an observer, but as distortionary by participants (Newby, 2010:10).

While all aid interventions probably cause some unintended effects, it is difficult to determine or attribute these to specific projects or activities. However, Newby's overview does identify donors as bearing much of the responsibility for identifying and mitigating the negative unintended effects.

In addition, unintended effects have been taken up by the aid development sector itself. A key document is the OECD/DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluation (2010), widely used in Terms of References and in evaluation reports. Here the emphasis is on results reporting (impact) and determining the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and sustainability of an intervention.

The OECD/DAC concepts stem mainly from logical models, used for planning an intervention. These frameworks vary in focus, and may be termed 'result framework' or 'logical framework' approach – most often they are variations of the latter. 'Logframe' is a planning tool used to deduce what actions and resources are needed in order to implement an intervention, and applies several 'steps'.

Inputs are used (through activities) in order to achieve specific outputs. Many such outputs then lead to the outcomes of the intervention, which again will lead to an impact. The three last stages of logframe are defined as the results or effects attributed to an intervention (OECD/DAC, 2002). The concept of unintended effects is normally defined as a sub-category of impacts, through the OECD/DAC definition 'Positive or negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended' (OECD/DAC, 2002, p. 24).

However, we also find ‘unintended effects’ in the discussion of the analytical terms effects and results, which indicates that the term is relevant and applicable for all result-levels in the programme theory or results framework. Here, however, it should be stressed that a project cannot guarantee that intended outcomes or impacts will be achieved – only outputs. The actual outcomes and impacts are beyond the direct control of project staff.

That said, in connection with the preparation of the present report, the only guidelines dealing with unintended effects beyond OECD/DAC’s standard criteria were found in DfID and Sida. The Norad Evaluation Department has used Sida’s evaluation manual since 2006.

Due to the similarity of concepts used in *Guidance on Evaluation and Review for DfID Staff* (DfID, 2005) and *Looking Back, Moving Forward: Sida Evaluation Manual* (Molund & Schill, 2004), they will be discussed together here. DfID does not define each concept explicitly, but includes possible evaluation questions that facilitate identification of the different effects. While including several of the same concepts as Merton and Newby, these guidelines identify unintended effects as an underlying impact, and describe only the negative unintended effects.

In development aid, it is essential for the intended benefits to reach the target group. The first effect described is called ‘mistakes in targeting’ or ‘targeting errors’. While DfID uses two different evaluation questions, thus indicating there are two different forms of such errors, Sida explicitly identifies three types:

- *Not all targeted included* problems happen when the benefits of an intervention fail to reach all intended sub-groups of recipients, or benefits are biased in distribution.
- *Non-target included* is when non-targeted groups get access to the designated resources or benefits.
- *Recoil* effects are instances when beneficiaries of development interventions become overburdened, for example through excess reporting practices. Such instances may, however, prompt capacity-building efforts.

The three flaws mentioned above are unintended effects – but they could also be characterized as technical insufficiencies of the programmes that can be remedied without going into depth on the aid system as such. The three errors mentioned immediately below, however, are caused by the aid system itself. Avoiding or significantly reducing such errors will require more in terms of analysis on the part of the programme holders and aid management system.

Fungibility is noted in the guidelines, in order to identify instances where lending or aid-flows have shifted the beneficiaries’ own resources to other sectors.

Substitution and *displacement* are effects that occur while anticipated objectives are realized. *Substitution* refers to instances when interventions ‘crowd out’ or replace agents operating within the same sectors, e.g. subsidizing one bank may crowd out other, unsubsidized, banks. *Displacement* occurs when interventions in one sector leads to a reduction in activities in other sectors (e.g. subsidizing wages in specific sectors may draw workers from other sectors).

Perverse effects go in the opposite direction of the intention, by yielding outcomes that are more negative than positive: e.g., instead of making a nation less dependent on donors, it may become more dependent. This can also refer to interventions that serve to weaken existing local power relations, in contrast to intentions; this is among the main points of the social effects that Newby (2010) presents.

These effects are described in order to clarify specific unintended effects that are of interest to most organizations. However, as will be discussed in the non-Norad reports section, DfID or Sida reports generally do not present a thorough discussion of the effects described above.

In addition to all these concepts, an overview of unintended effects is offered in Norad’s *Assessment of Sustainability Elements/Key Risk Factors: Practical Guide* (Norad & Norwegian MFA, 2010). Here unintended effects are included as part of risk assessments:

Being conflict sensitive means that development programmes/projects are assessed and adjusted in relation to the violent conflict in which they are being implemented, with a view to avoid unintended negative impacts and maximize positive ones. As a minimum, any intervention must be conscious about risks. (Norad & Norwegian MFA, 2010, p. 6)

That wording indicates that unintended effects are seen as connected to conflict, risks and sustainability, at least as viewed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad.

3. To what extent are unintended effects addressed in Norad evaluations?

Methodology

In addition to the scholarly literature on unintended effects, we have consulted the guidelines and handbooks of the World Bank, UNDP, UNEG, OECD/DAC, DfID, Sida and Danida.

The main task as set out in the ToR was to read through all evaluations commissioned by the Evaluation Department in Norad (hereafter referred to as Norad evaluations), for the three-year period 2010–2014. The Evaluation Department had commissioned 38 evaluations, but some of these involved separate country studies issued as standalone publications, yielding a total of 78 separate reports to be analysed (see list in Annex 5). First, we conducted a 'mechanical' search through the Norad evaluations to find the frequency of the words *unintended*, *unexpected*, *unforeseen*, *unplanned* and *unanticipated* in any part of the report, as a rough indicator of the degree to which unintended effects are taken up. We then examined all 78 reports carefully to identify if and how they discuss unintended effects, always aware that unintended effects might be discussed without there being a direct reference as such. We employed a screening matrix / research template to record the reviews of the evaluations (see Annex 2). We checked whether the identification of unintended effects was included in the ToR for each evaluation, and also checked whether the evaluations describe unintended effects without the ToR having specifically requested this. Then we proceeded to identify at what point in time such effects were discovered in the project, in what ways the context was relevant for the effects, reasons given by the evaluator; further, how positive effects were exploited and negative effects mitigated, perhaps in worst case leading to project closure. Did the evaluation mention possible counterfactual project designs that might have given a different result? Finally, we assessed whether the unintended effects were due to the project design.

We next searched for differences between the approaches used by Norad and other donor agencies of including unintended effects. The number of Norad evaluations varies from one aid sector to another; we decided to focus the comparison on aid sectors with the greatest numbers of evaluations: Democracy & Governance, Education, Human Rights and Environmental & Climate (see Annex 3).

In order to maximise the probability of finding non-Norad evaluations that do discuss unintended effects, we applied two filters. Firstly, we selected evaluations from aid agencies that operated with evaluation manuals. This, we believed, would increase the probability of finding evaluations that discuss unintended effects in greater detail than merely by referring to the generalized criteria presented in the OECD-DAC manuals. Secondly, we selected the non-Norad reports that included one of our search words, as described in the methodology section above. Thus our sample is not meant to be representative of the entire universe of all non-Norad evaluations within the five selected sectors: the focus is on non-Norad evaluations that address the issue of unintended effects. In addition, as a random control we selected some evaluations from aid agencies without evaluation manuals and/or with no hits on our key words. To enable direct comparison, most of the non-Norad evaluations have been matched as to type of project and country with an explicit Norad evaluation.

Unfortunately, many evaluations do not refer to or present a programme theory for the programmes under evaluation. That has made it difficult to distinguish between intended and unintended effects.

A statistical overview

Our statistics are solely based on the reports mentioned above. We do not include discussed effects that may be unintended effects but not are explicitly defined or presented as such by the authors of the reports. However, such examples will be taken up in the qualitative discussion in the following subchapters. Further, the statistics partly involve our interpretations, as unintended effects are seldom discussed explicitly but are mentioned more implicitly under 'effects', 'outcomes' and 'impacts' of the projects themselves. The Norad evaluations were divided into three categories: *joint evaluations*, *evaluation reports*, and *evaluation studies*. They were all initiated by the evaluation department of Norad. As noted, with each evaluation we conducted an electronic search for the following terms: *unintended*, *unexpected*, *unforeseen*, *unplanned* and *unanticipated*. The code 'hit' refers to any use of the indicator either in the ToR or the report itself. We found that one or more of these key words were mentioned in 46% of the standalone evaluation reports (36 out of 78, see statistics in Annex 3). It is often a matter of subjective judgement whether the outputs, or the actual deliverables of a given project, have a positive or negative impact. We had to rely on the interpretations of the evaluators or programme officers in the electronic search. The search word might also appear in another context and hence represent a 'false hit', but random checks indicated this problem did not represent a major source of bias.

Are there differences between aid sectors regarding the likeliness that unintended effects are addressed? We found references to the 'unintended' indicator in all evaluations within the sectors of Humanitarian Aid and Business Development; further, the hit score in Governance and Democracy was 63%,

Anti-corruption 55%, but only 31% for Cross sector, 12% for Environment and Climate, and none for some sectors that have few reports.

Does the ToR request that unintended effects should be addressed? We found that less than 40% of the ToR made any references to our search-word 'unintended effect' (see explicit statistics in Table 1 in Annex 4). Since less than 65% of the evaluators included some kind of reference or discussion of unintended effects, that implies that one out of three disregarded the request of discussing the issue which is necessary even if no unintended effects were found. However, we find it surprising that Norad did not give any specific instructions concerning unintended effects in more than 60% of the ToR examined for this study. Some 25% of the evaluations included the indicator 'unintended', but nearly 75% paid no attention to this dimension. This finding indicates that Norad should formally request a discussion of unintended effects – despite referring to the OECD criteria, which clearly request that unintended effects to be part the analysis – as a guiding principle on how to conduct the evaluation.

Ways of searching for and including unintended effects in the evaluations

Our analysis, examining in depth the chapters on outcomes and impacts (which, according to the OECD methodology, is where the discussion of unintended effects belongs), showed that the evaluations were quite shallow in the way they discussed the issue.

Even though ToR may not ask explicitly that unintended effects be mentioned or examined, it often includes some kind of reference in that direction – such as 'the intention to draw lessons and allow corrections to be made, where necessary, in real time' as given in the forest initiative evaluation (Norad 2012/5)². When there is explicit mention, the wording often follows the standard formulation of the OECD manuals 'all effects, intended and unintended, that results from the project' (OECD/DAC, 2010). This standardized formulation does not explicitly request differentiated treatment, which might explain why, in the reports examined for this study, the evaluators tended to discuss all types of effects without distinguishing between those that were intended and those that were not.

Only in very few instances do the ToR instruct the evaluators to investigate certain issues where adverse unintended effects might be expected. The Norad evaluation on the effect of culture and sport cooperation (Norad 2011/3) indicates the suspicion that local leaders might exchange the possibility of travel to Norway for sexual services from the candidates; furthermore that such travels might disillusion the young on their return to poverty after visiting a rich country. Surprisingly, the evaluators fail to discuss these questions at all, in the main report and in the various country reports. On the other hand, they show willingness to discuss unintended effects directly by using phrases like

² In the references, 'Norad' is used to indicate Norad Evaluation Department, with year and report series number.

'regarding unintended effects can only speculate that....artistic expression becomes more rather than less elitist' and 'can only speculate that.... more dependent on Norwegian aid to maintain the museums open'. Apparently, relying on such loose formulations without any empirical proof, not even quotations from those interviewed, is a common solution to the request in the ToR. As a result, the analytical value as a basis for future adjustment is rather restricted.

Discussion on effects in the evaluations

The OECD guidelines define various forms of unintended negative effects, as discussed in the literature review. We do not find similarly defined categories for unintended positive effects in the reports examined for this study. We have noted instances where unintended *positive* effects are identified in the Norad evaluations, but since the authors do not necessarily specify them as unintended effects, they do not classify them in subcategories.

An example of an unintended positive effect is found in the country report for Norwegian Business-related Assistance in Bangladesh (Norad, 2010/5). The report states that an investment in Grameen Phone, a not-for-profit company created by Grameen Telecom and Telenor, had positive effects beyond what had been intended. The evaluator(s) attributed the *intended* effect of rapid expansion of access to communication for the poor to a soft loan by Norad and a five-year loan by Norfund, which had ample positive albeit unintended ramifications (Norad 2010/5:57,104). The specific effects were included in an annex table in the evaluation that specified Grameen Phone as stimulating greater competition in communication markets, introducing and emphasising Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the sector, providing poor people with access to communication, and accounting for 8% of the GDP growth in Bangladesh from 1996 to 2008. However impressive these effects, the report fails to distinguish which of them are to be identified as unexpected or as anticipated.

In some evaluations the concept of 'unintended effect' is defined very broadly, as when an increase in school attendance among children who have taken part in a theatre project is classified as an unintended effect (Sida 2008/29). Other evaluators give examples of project activities having been picked up and replicated beyond the target areas of the original programme. In Norad (2011/1) these are classified as 'unintended effects', but might equally well have been analysed as outcomes. Regarding this evaluation, the ToR had specified that attention be paid to unintended effects. In Sida 2012/2 a similar argument on community-level activities being inspired by the project is subsumed under 'unintended effects'.

Also the highly planned activity of the Norwegian People's Aid that brought together partners from a media project and a women's project and resulted in 40 media outlets is subsumed under 'unintended effects' by the evaluators. In other cases, phenomena are described as unintended effects but without the evaluation indicating the attributive links, as when the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights is given credit for the mushrooming of human rights centres in

Indonesia. The two latter examples are from Norad 2011/7, where the ToR stipulated that unintended effects should be addressed.

Among the unintended negative effects as defined in the Sida and DfID reports we find the following examples:

Pashtun-speaking groups in Afghanistan were underrepresented in the democracy support through the United Nations (Norad, 2010/10) and hence represent a *not all targeted included* unintended effect. The *non-target included* unintended effect is described by Søreide and others (Norad, 2012/2), as presumed non-beneficiaries were able to receive *per diems* as described in the evaluation of this form of compensation in three African countries. We find the *substitution* unintended effect in the example of cheap financing from Norfund which can crowd out local banks as described in the 'additionality' section in several evaluations on business-related assistance (2010/3-6).

In Norad 2010/7 it is pointed out that aid failed to achieve sufficient outreach to engage potential agents of change. Local actors in the Western Balkans had problems in gaining visibility and access to Norwegian funds, for reasons the evaluators found to be unintended effects of core aspects of the aid model applied. The 'Norwegian model', entailing a large role for Norwegian NGOs, had the unintended effect of obstructing local West Balkan ownership. Likewise, Norway's much-acclaimed ability to be flexible and move fast in the region came at the cost of long-term commitment and follow-up, the evaluators note. This evaluation dealt with unintended effects in some depth, although that was not requested in the ToR.

One example of *displacement* unintended effect is how assistance by Oil for Development has led to higher export revenues, thereby appreciating the currency and reducing the competitiveness of traditional export industries (Norad 2012/6:83,88). As the latter employ women, the total unintended effect is to distort the gender power balance. Such negative macro-effects are no decisive argument against otherwise positive effects, but it is essential to identify them before the programme starts, to enable countermeasures to be designed that might compensate the affected. The Support to Legislatures evaluation (Norad, 2010/2) describes how 'donors are ganging up' against local politicians by coordinating their demands, resulting in a sense of powerlessness among policy makers, in turn leading to less ownership to the on-going projects. This *recoil* effect might have disastrous effects on the quality of implementation. The same evaluation establishes that donors have imposed a new governance system on the traditional system, which 'may unintentionally lead to greater instability', but no mention is made of any specific effects from the OECD category.

Further, we find the *fungibility* unintended effect in Kenya through the release of resources that might have been used for other purposes (Sida/UNDP, 2007). The typical *perverse* unintended effect, discussed only briefly, is that projects

tend to increase dependency on the donors rather than bolstering the ability to fend for themselves – which is the overarching development goal of any intervention. The creation of any service to the population that the government cannot finance, because of limited tax revenues, will almost by definition create greater dependency and is hence defined as a perverse effect. Reports often discuss increased dependency in the sustainability chapter, but seldom touch upon the vital question of duration, e.g. Norad (2010/3:62) and Norad (2010/10:31).

As an example of a perverse unintended effect in the intermediate term, increased dependency by receiving fertilizers subsidies might lead to greater independence in the long term if it brings better nutrition for the population, making them more receptive to education, and thereby enabling them in the long run to fend for themselves. Another perverse effect is noted in Norad 2011/6. Here the programme targeted only administrative cadres because they were the most powerful groups within the civil service and therefore presumably best placed for promoting reform. However, as trainings in-country and abroad involved significant perks, the programme fuelled existing divisions between administrative and non-administrative cadres, which was not conducive to reform implementation. The ToR for this evaluation made no mention of unintended effects. Likewise, Danida 2013/1 notes one unintended effect of emphasising advocacy work: smaller, local community-based organisations get less opportunity to build capacity and legitimacy through grass-roots development work.

Foreseeable effects, any adjustments by project owners, deeper discussion of effects

The evaluations seldom discuss whether an unintended effect might have been foreseen, or if the project owners did anything to adjust along the way. However, there are some exceptions, such as the NORCAP evaluation that explains how the design of refugee housing in Pakistan was adjusted to prevent negative effects linked to local gender norms (Norad, 2013/4).

Counterfactual project design

The examples above illustrate that practical adjustments in the project are possible. It would also be of interest to know whether a different design altogether could have achieved similar for less money, or have yielded better results. We did not find any clear examples of such counterfactual analysis in the evaluations examined.

Three 'best practises' of including unintended effects

Our systematic review showed a general picture of unintended effects being addressed in evaluations only superficially and with a shallow analytical approach. The lack of fuller empirical data – apart from the finding that there exists little in terms of such data – made us more aware of those evaluations that stood out as exceptions. In this sub-chapter we present three relatively clear

examples of how unintended effects have been addressed in evaluation. Closer examination of these cases may promote reflection on what is needed to strengthen the analysis of unintended effects within aid management.

Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council's and the Standby Roster NORCAP (Norad 2013/4)

The ToR of the evaluation requested specific investigation into the unintended effects of the use of food vouchers in two of the three countries included in the study, but not of unintended effects in general. In fact, this specific request seems to have sparked a discussion of other concrete practical, changeable effects. However, the evaluation does not analyse the more fundamental effects of the intervention on local society. In South Sudan the evaluation finds that the rapid upscaling of WASH programmes led to confusion and unclear responsibilities between programme leaders, which may have ended up reducing the total supply of services. However, the evaluation does not mention what was done to deal with the problem. In Pakistan, it was found that the refugees built an internal wall to separate men from women in their new one-room houses, thereby reducing quality of life since the women now lost access to the sole window in the house. The NRC is reported to have learned from the experience by changing the design of the housing. In Somalia it was found that food vouchers did not have the suspected negative unintended effect of being sold on the street; the evaluation also mentions how 'gatekeepers' of the camp lost the possibility of selling the tents when NRC started constructing less tradable hard hut-shelters instead. By chance the evaluators stumbled upon a major fundamental unintended effect of supporting refugees. The NRC cannot prevent 'gatekeepers', similar to a local mafia, from controlling the camps and taking advantage, but the evaluations do not discuss the details, or other repercussions like strengthening such criminal tendencies in local society outside the camp. We cannot deduce any concrete explanation for why these matters were not discussed in the evaluations. In our own experience as evaluators, we have often found that programme officers see negative effects as an unavoidable necessary 'cost' that they must accept in order to conduct an intervention that will bring many positive effects for the beneficiaries.

Supporting Child Rights: Synthesis of Lessons Learned in Four Countries. (Sida/Norad, 2011:1)

In this joint Norad and Sida evaluation, the ToR instructed the evaluators to identify unintended outcomes. However, since few outcomes were identified, the evaluators included unintended outputs in general. We have noted especially how the country report for Mozambique (Sida/Norad, 2011:2) made explicit reference to unintended effects in the *Zambezi River Bridge Project*.

The intended purpose of this project was to construct a bridge to replace a ferry-transport that frequently broke down. Pre-project, the riverbank had turned into an informal trading post, including food, accommodation and sexual services. The initiation of the project led to one Social Impact Assessment (SIA), two

Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), a poverty analysis, health and HIV baseline assessments, and finally a development project mapping survey. These studies produced an Environmental Action Plan that included social aspects regarding '[...] HIV prevention through educative interventions targeting construction workers, local communities, sex workers, young girls, travellers, truck drivers and unaccompanied men in general' (Sida/Norad, 2011/2: 27). The evaluation report holds that large investments in infrastructure, combined with civil society involvement, have had several additional benefits, e.g. 'improved the local service provision and fostered the realization of child rights as they improved the access to health and education services, enhanced safety and security in the area, raised awareness about child abuse and reduced sexual exploitation' (Sida/Norad, 2011/2: 27).

This exemplifies one of the more explicit identifications of unintended effects. However, before describing the effects mentioned above, the report merely states in general terms that there are both intended and unintended effects. Thus, it is still difficult to discern which of these effects were unintended. Such examples are mainly found at the project level, referring to immediate or short-term outcomes.

Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with Afghanistan (2001-2011) (Norad, 2012/3)

This evaluation went into greater depth on unintended effects than most other evaluations. According to this evaluation, Norwegian aid in Afghanistan has been deficient in analyses of the relationship between the Afghan state, international NGOs and Afghan NGOs/civil society. The report notes the unintended effects resulting from basing the aid intervention on Norwegian NGOs, which led to projects being located in relatively safe (and well-off) areas, where civilian foreigners could operate. In this way, the linkages between the military efforts to support improved governance and the development programme suffered. Moreover, there were few links to the authorities, so the Norwegian NGOs were perceived as parallel structures rather than entities that supported public efforts. As the evaluation report sums up:

Prior research found that development projects, rather than generating good will and positive perceptions, were consistently described negatively by Afghans. Responses suggested that not only were projects not winning people over to the government side, but perceptions of the misuse and abuse of aid resources were in many cases fuelling the growing distrust of the government, creating enemies, or at least generating scepticism regarding the role of the government and aid agencies (Norad 2012/3:127)

Likewise the evaluation of a Danish refugee-return programme notes the lack of formal conflict analysis of the potential impact of their projects on the conflict. It states rather tersely: 'Analysis of the conflict is normally limited to the potential impact of the conflict on their projects rather than the other way around.' (Danida, 2012/1:13) There is no request that the programme implementers

monitor the immediate and longer-term impacts that their interventions may have on conflict dynamics.

The issues brought to the fore in the Afghanistan evaluation (Norad 2012/3) are important, but were not followed up in-depth. It is tempting to speculate why evaluations of Afghanistan seem especially prone to mention side-effects. It may indicate that the tendency of development aid's tendency to shun conflict analysis is simply impossible in the case of Afghanistan.

4. Difference between Norad evaluations and non-Norad publications

We find few distinct differences between Norad evaluations and the reports commissioned by and for other organizations. In their guidelines or handbooks both DfID and Sida include deep and thorough definitions of various unintended effects, and Norad applies the Sida handbook in its own evaluations³.

As mentioned, the actual handling of these problems does not differ significantly from the approaches in Norad reports. Although both explicit and implicit descriptions of unintended effects have been found, our observations indicate a lack of discussion regarding the mechanisms related to such effects. However, our findings also indicate that the explicit references in non-Norad reports seem to focus more on the *positive* unintended effects of development aid, while Norad reports explicitly identify negative ones more often. For all cases (explicit or implicit identification), the effects are barely identified, resulting in confusion as to whether evaluators deem them important, or whether they have reflected upon the long-term consequences entailed.

The evaluations commissioned by Norad's evaluation department explicitly include mention of both positive and negative unintended effects, whereas the most explicitly identified effects in the non-Norad reports are positive ones: negative effects are reported more indirectly, without classifying them as such. It thus seems that Norad reports are more balanced in reporting on *all types* of unintended effects. As regards ensuring that this topic is dealt with more thoroughly, it does not appear sufficient to include specific terms or concepts only in the guidelines, as Sida and DFID do. Explicitly including in the ToR such concepts as perverse effects, fungibility, substitutions and displacement, mistakes in targeting and recoil effects might yield more discussion or explicit identification of such effects. This we cannot know, as the non-Norad evaluations that were examined rarely included the ToR.

³ The Norad Evaluation Department inform us that they apply the Sida handbook as tool in the preparation of the ToR for their own evaluations.

5. Main observations

Our analysis of the body of evaluations revealed several main characteristics.

Lack of results framework and programme theory: As noted, we rarely found an explicit results framework or the resulting programme theory reproduced in the evaluation. This might reflect a similar flaw in the aid programme that is evaluated. Without a clear idea of what is expected it is difficult to deal with the issue of unexpected effects. Aid thus risks causing unintended harm, while also missing out on opportunities to build on outcomes that were positive, albeit unexpected.

Evaluators tend to lump all effects together, making it difficult to separate the intended effects from unintended ones. The underlying reason is that evaluations seldom report a detailed programme theory or results framework that reflects how the programme owners believe the intervention, with inputs and activities, is expected to result in explicit outputs, outcomes and impacts. At best, they might give the overall objective of the study, then list goals that are supposed to be linked to the objective, and finally list the actions that will take place. Such listing does not give the explicit causal mechanism between them. Two possible explanations come to mind. Either the institutions do not have any well-formulated programme theory with a corresponding results framework; or, alternatively, the evaluators have not been successful in recapturing the essentials of the programmes from documents and interviews.

Moreover, the ToR seldom explicitly instructs the evaluators to recapitulate the pre-project programme theory, which would have made it possible to identify observed results as either intended or unintended effects of the project. The evaluations of Democracy Support through the United Nations in several countries (Norad, 2010/10) represents an exception: they list pre-project intended outcomes in an annex, making it possible to identify the effects discussed in the report itself as either intended or unintended, although the evaluators does not make this distinction in the text. Indeed, the evident lack of any explicit discussion of the results framework itself, whether found satisfactory or not, is probably the main obstacle to a thorough discussion of unintended effects.

Emphasis on positive effects: When evaluations mention unintended effects, it is often in terms of positive side-effects, even if the Norad evaluations also mention positive effects, that are hardly distinguishable from the expected outcomes. Often such accounts amount to stating that project activities have been picked up and emulated by other groups than those directly targeted by the

intervention. Discussions of unintended effects tend to concentrate on aspects of project-level outcomes. Reflections on the possible negative side-effects of interfering in a vulnerable society are conspicuously absent. However, elements of an exception to this rule can be found in evaluations of aid in conflict areas, notably Afghanistan and other areas with war-like conflicts, where the aid management system has long been aware of the risks of unintended effects in countries in danger of violent outbursts.

Only minor effects discussed: There is a clear tendency in the evaluations to concentrate on concrete unintended effects that can easily be corrected by the project manager. The more problematic the unintended effect, the less is it discussed and problematized. This might have to do with the genre of evaluations aimed at operative recommendations rather than fostering general reflections. The fact that the overwhelming majority of side-effects mentioned refer to minor effects made it impossible to classify them in a meaningful way. The NRC example (Norad 2012/4) discussed above illustrates this point: it focuses on how new locks in refugee housing served to increase the sense of security, but has little to say about the rise a local mafia due to the influx of donor aid with the refugee camp. The evaluators merely observe the existence of such 'gatekeepers'.

Macro-effects absent: We found hardly any references to possible macro-effects of interventions. Reference to fungibility, which in the end might create a perverse effect, is scarcely evident found in any of the evaluations examined. Documenting such a relationship is difficult with for smaller projects, but it should be feasible in programmes that have considerable budget support, at least with qualitative information from bureaucrats. Our assessment of a large number of evaluations has shown that even in cases when unintended effects could have been predicted rather easily, they are not taken up in the evaluations. For instance, it is fairly obvious that engaging local civil society organisations or membership organisations in donor-financed project work may easily divert the organisation's attention away from its constituency to the requirements for performance and reporting imposed by the donors.

Easily predicted but unintended effects are not discussed: The evaluations do not discuss whether the unintended effects could have been predicted. The likelihood of unintended affects occurring is simply not an issue. From the discussion above, we can conclude that some side-effects are in fact easy to foresee. As they are caused by core mechanisms in development aid, they are produced in large numbers and in a range of settings. These side-effects relate mainly to the tendency of target groups to focus on the material stimuli, and not the activities that these stimuli are meant to promote. Another side-effect concerns the recruitment of 'actors of change' into the aid sector, thereby depriving local society of valuable individuals. These negative side-effects might be considered unavoidable within the system of development aid, but they could be mitigated if included in planning, reporting and evaluation of the activities.

Unclear and empty language employed: There is a conspicuous lack of clear language and critical remarks in the evaluations. Development projects are

conducted under difficult conditions where much can, and will, go wrong even for experienced actors. Therefore, for learning purposes a thorough discussion of unintended effects is definitely needed. On the other hand, there may be some obstacles to making evaluations a tool for analysing the unintended effects and by-products of aid interventions. Reasons for seeking to avoid critical remarks include the culture of appearing efficient and technocratic, as well as the wish on the part of evaluators not to get involved in protracted processes of text revising, entailing more work-hours on the evaluation than was funded. The more controversial (and hence interesting) the findings, the stronger are the proofs required to avoid endless discussions with the commissioning instance and the institutions being evaluated. Delivering clear, unambiguous statements requires considerable preparation and effort; evaluators might be tempted to resort to opaque formulations instead, as the evaluation budget will normally not have room for such lengthy exercises. Furthermore, interviewees and other informants may be reluctant to open up for discussion of difficult issues, for fear of losing further funding. Sometimes they do, but often under the assumed agreement that such open-hearted information should not be included directly in the evaluation reports. The real learning process and feedback often take place in oral and written communications not included in the report itself.

Donors affect the political equilibrium: Evaluators seldom consider the wider political effects of the project in question. And yet, development aid normally does affect the political equilibrium within the country. Even choosing one routing rather than another in constructing a new road may change the local power balance. Many projects actively try to change the political equilibrium by supporting what is perceived as oppressing the people. Some evaluations of projects in countries deep in conflict do discuss the possibility that support might have an opposite, undesired effect, but this is rarely mentioned if there is no imminent threat of war. A notable exception here is the Sida evaluation of human rights and civic education in Kenya (Sida/UNDP, 2007), which finds that trained and supported para-legals use funds and prestige as a basis for personal political campaigns in local elections. By contrast, none of the evaluations of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative mention their support to indigenous groups as a possible source of revolt against democratically elected governments. The projects consider that there is a need to strengthen local voices to make up for a long history of oppression. However, through the intended effect of greater organisational strength, some of these groups are now resorting to violence in certain situations in order to protect what they see as 'their rights' on 'their territory'. This brings to mind the 'not-in-my-backyard' resistance to projects for developing national resources that entail potentials for bringing the entire population out of poverty. The unintended effect is further to destabilize the country by making the regions less governable. One clear example is the Bagua episode in 2009 that resulted in nearly 50 people killed in a clash between members of the indigenous population organized by a Norwegian-funded activist and the Peruvian police and military forces. Did deliberate choice of partner increase the tension, and what did the Norwegian counterpart do to reduce the risk of violence? Vital questions of methodology become evident in extreme situations, with higher learning potential to develop important safeguards than any routine end-of-project evaluation.

6. Conclusions and recommendations

Avoiding the problem of unintended effects

Our screening of the evaluations shows that they seldom contain thorough and in-depth analyses of unintended and unexpected effects of development aid. We were surprised to note how many discussions of side-effects were evasive and shallow. Not even in cases where unintended effects are highly likely did evaluators include them in a comprehensive way. This holds true across the various sectors of aid. In one of three Norad evaluations there was no mention of unintended effects even when this was explicitly specified in the ToR. When the ToR did not explicitly mention side-effects, only one out of four evaluations took up the issue.

Referring to, or repeating, the general wording in the OECD/DAC recommendations in ToR for evaluations is simply not sufficient to induce evaluators to address the question of side-effects. Assessing the possible existence of unintended side-effects is far more demanding than the traditional exercise of merely checking whether intended effects were produced.

Recommendation: Evaluation ToR should indicate in specific terms the type of unintended effects to be traced in the evaluation. The selection of effect-type must be based on prior knowledge of the activities to be evaluated and the kinds of side-effects likely to occur.

Recommendation: In addition to paying greater attention to unintended effects in the ordinary evaluations, commissioning agencies should open up for evaluations that focus solely on side-effects: some evaluations should be conducted with the explicit intention of identifying and analysing the unintended effects. The evaluation of the per-diem system in Norad (2012/2) is a good example that has unfortunately not been repeated on other issues afterward. This may prove particularly relevant for problematic cases of development aid. For instance: What are the side-effects of working through NGOs? What are the unintended side-effects of engaging large segments of the most skilled young people in post-conflict areas in project work for international donors? Research on development issues has shown how aid may have unintended effects on the macro-level, with the most commonly discussed phenomena being the 'Dutch disease', the fungibility effect, and the distortion of democratic accountability. Certain macro-level issues would probably require a larger research project of a scope more likely to be funded through the Research Council of Norway than by Norad. Researchers should be free to select projects that can illuminate the given theme adequately and clearly.

Unclear logics, language and structure in evaluations.

Our code-word search analysis gives an exaggerated impression of the degree to which unintended effects are actually taken up for discussion in the text of the evaluations studied here. In most cases, such effects are merely mentioned, and not followed up by analysis. This applies in particular to unintended positive effects, which are rarely substantiated by explanations of how the aid activities evaluated came to yield such effects. We found no explanations, or even speculations, as to the mechanisms that might have led to the unintended effects. Bringing results to the public eye would probably move evaluators to employ more active, accessible language and to search for concrete results to present.

Recommendation: Agencies commissioning evaluations should request texts that are readable, not least because this will force evaluators to sharpen their arguments and logic. Crediting proven records in publishing popularized versions of the evaluations, e.g. as newspaper op-eds, should be considered as part of tenders.

Discovering unintended effects in extreme situations

It is easier to identify the unintended effects if the intervention was either an outright success or an outright failure. Especially in the latter case is it important for Norad to start the investigation as soon as possible in order to learn, as with the Bagua episode mentioned above. More can be learned from extreme situations, both positive and negative, than from evaluating mid-level successes. However, here exist several disincentives that discourage project holders and evaluators alike from bringing up unintended effects except in cases when they are unequivocally positive.

Recommendation: Attention to unintended effects should be included in design and monitoring of development aid activities, according to the principle of 'Do no harm'. The practice of conducting risk analyses must be developed into a tool for taking account of more than the risk of no effect, but also the risks of wrong effects.

Annexes



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Sida (2012/2) *Review of the Sida-funded Project Education for Sustainable Development in Action (ESDA)*, compiled by V. Devine & R. Eriksson

Annex 2 Structure for analysis of evaluations

- Title of evaluation, purpose of project(s) evaluated
- Does the ToR request the analysis of unintended effects; if yes (i) general or (ii) specific form?
- Does the evaluation mention unintended effects?
- If yes, in what form:
 - direct (general or specific) vs. indirect (pros/cons, our interpretation), short summary of effect with page number
 - when known: at start, mid-project, at end, never?
 - context of effect
 - reason given by evaluator for unintended effects
 - anything done reduce negative or increase positive unintended effects, especially abort project if effect is very damaging
 - any counterfactual discussion on possible effects of choosing another design
 - our assessment as to
 - whether the effect can really attributed to the project
 - should have been easy to ascertain in the planning stage
- If no,
 - do the ToR request the analysis of unintended effects?
 - our assessment whether one could expect such effects to be present

Annex 3 Unintended consequences by sector

Sector	No. of Reports	Hits Percentage
Cross-sector	16	31,25%
Governance & Democracy	11	63,64%
Anti-Corruption	9	55,56%
Environment & Climate	8	12,50
Human Rights	8	37,50%
Culture & Sports	6	50,00%
Humanitarian Aid	5	100,00%
Business Development	4	100,00%
Health	4	25,00%
Education & Research	2	0,00%
Agriculture, forestation and fishing	1	0,00%
Civil Society	1	0,00%
Conflict, peace & Security	1	100,00%
Natural Resources	1	100,00%
Trade & transport	1	0,00%

Sorted by: Total No. Of Reports
Sectors chosen for comparison with foreign reports in darker blue

Description:

The table presents the categorisation of the 78 Norad reports by development sector. They are sorted by number of reports in each sector. In most cases, these sectors were stated on Norad's web-pages; however, a few were not, and were subjected to the authors' judgement. In the events where evaluations were part of multiple sectors that were not closely related, they were defined as 'cross-sector'.

The 'hits' percentage represents the rate of reports within each sector that had 'at least one search-term hit', with the search words being *unintended*, *unplanned*, *unexpected*, *unanticipated* and *undesirable*.

Annex 4 Unintended consequences by type

Description:

The following table provides a broader description of statistics from the 78 Norad reports according to development sector. Some assessments are assigning reports to different sectors as in the previous table.

*Reports with type of **Un-**:* Refers to the number of reports within each sector with a 'hit' for each search-term.

Type of inclusion: Here the table distinguishes between the location of 'hits', whether in the reports themselves, in the ToR, in both or in neither of them. All of these types also include as share of total reports in each sector.

Sector	Reports	Reports with hits	Share hits	Reports with type of hits Un-						Type of inclusion						
				intended	planned	expected	foreseen	desirable	Not ToR, not Report	Share not Report	ToR, not report	Share	Not ToR, report	Share	ToR, report (both)	Share
Agriculture, forestation and fishing	1	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Anti-Corruption	9	5	56%	4	0	1	2	0	4	44%	0	0%	3	33%	2	22%
Business Development	4	4	100%	4	4	1	1	0	0	0%	2	50%	0	0%	2	50%
Civil Society	1	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Conflict, peace & Security	1	1	100%	1	0	1	1	0	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	100%
Cross-sector	16	5	31%	5	1	1	0	1	7	44%	3	19%	2	13%	4	25%
Culture & Sports	6	3	50%	3	0	0	0	0	0	0%	3	50%	0	0%	3	50%
Education & Research	2	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	2	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Environment & Climate	8	1	13%	1	0	0	0	0	7	88%	0	0%	1	13%	0	0%
Governance & Democracy	11	7	64%	3	0	3	2	0	4	36%	0	0%	6	55%	1	9%
Health	4	1	25%	1	0	0	0	1	3	75%	0	0%	0	0%	1	25%
Human Rights	8	3	38%	2	0	1	0	0	4	50%	2	25%	1	13%	1	13%
Humanitarian Aid	5	5	100%	4	0	1	0	0	0	0%	1	20%	0	0%	4	80%
Natural Resources	1	1	100%	0	1	0	0	0	0	0%	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%
Trade & transport	1	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Total	78	36	46%	28	6	9	5	2	34	44%	12	15%	13	17%	19	24%

Annex 5 List of Norad reports

Publishing Year	Report No.	Commissioned by	Performed by	Title
2010	1/2010	Norad Evaluation Department (EVAL)	NIBR	Evaluation of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support 2002–2009
2010	2/2010	Norad EVAL	CMI	Support to Legislatures
2010	3/2010	Norad EVAL	Devfin Advisers AB	Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance, Main Report
	4/2010			Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance, South Africa Case Study
	5/2010			Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance, Bangladesh Case Study
	6/2010			Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance, Uganda Case Study
2010	7/2009	Norad EVAL	COWIAS	Evaluation of the Norwegian Programme for Development, Research and Education (NUFU) and of Norad EVAL's Programme for Master Studies (NOMA)
2010	7/2010	Norad EVAL	Scanteam	Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with the Western Balkans, Vols 1 & 2
2011	1/2011	Norad EVAL	Ternstrom Consulting AB	Results of Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in East Africa, Vols 1 & 2
2011	10/2010	Norad EVAL	Scanteam	Democracy Support through the United Nations
				Democracy Support through the United Nations, Case Report Guatemala
				Democracy Support through the United Nations, Case Report Malawi
				Democracy Support through the United Nations, Case Report Mozambique
				Democracy Support through the United Nations, Case Report Nepal
				Democracy Support through the United Nations, Case Report Pakistan
				Democracy Support through the United Nations, Case Report Sudan
				Democracy Support through the United Nations, Literature Review
Democracy Support through the United Nations, Mapping Study				
2011	11/2010	Norad EVAL	Mathematica Policy Research, Research Communications Group	Evaluation of the International Organization for Migration and its Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking (including separate annexes)

12/2010			Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative Contributions to National REDD+ Processes 2007–2010 Executive Summaries from Country Reports
13/2010			Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative Contributions to National REDD+ Processes 2007–2010 Country Report: Brazil
14/2010			Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative Contributions to National REDD+ Processes 2007–2010 Country Report: Democratic Republic of Congo
15/2010	Norad EVAL	LTS Int., Indufor Oy, Ecometrica & CMI	Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative Contributions to National REDD+ Processes 2007–2010 Country Report: Guyana
16/2010			Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative Contributions to National REDD+ Processes 2007–2010 Country Report: Indonesia
17/2010			Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative Contributions to National REDD+ Processes 2007–2010 Country Report: Tanzania
18/2010			Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative Contributions to a Global REDD+ Regime 2007–2010
2011	Norad EVAL	SIPU International	Evaluation of Research on Norwegian Development Assistance
2011:1			Supporting Child Rights Synthesis of Lessons Learned in Four Countries
2011:1			Supporting Child Rights Synthesis of Lessons Learned in Four Countries Country Case Study Guatemala
2011:2	Sida/Norad	Arne Tostensen, Hugo Stokke, Sven Trygged & Kate Halvorsen	Supporting Child Rights Synthesis of Lessons Learned in Four Countries Country Case Study Mozambique
2011:3			Supporting Child Rights Synthesis of Lessons Learned in Four Countries Country Case Study Sudan
2011:4			Supporting Child Rights Synthesis of Lessons Learned in Four Countries Country Case Study Kenya
			Evaluation of the Strategy for Norway's Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South
			Evaluation of the Strategy for Norway's Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South Case Country India
			Evaluation of the Strategy for Norway's Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South Case Country Mozambique
2011	Norad EVAL	Nordic Consulting Group	Evaluation of the Strategy for Norway's Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South Case Country Nicaragua
			Evaluation of the Strategy for Norway's Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South Case Country Palestinian Area
			Evaluation of the Strategy for Norway's Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South Case Country Zimbabwe

2011	4/2011	Norad EVAL	Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Masa Loncaric, Bianca Vaz Mundo, Ana Carolina Sponza Braga, Michael Weinhardt, Angelica Pulido Solares, Aiste Skardziute, Maira Martini, Fortune Agbele, Mette Frisk Jensen, Christian von Soest & Mariam Gabedava	Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption: Lessons Learned
2011	5/2011	Norad EVAL	CMI, University of London	Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997–2009
2011	6/2011	Norad EVAL, ADB, SADEV, Sida & DFID	ITAD Ltd.	Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts 2002–2009 Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts, Bangladesh Country Report Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts, Nicaragua Country Report Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts, Tanzania Country Report Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts, Viet Nam Country Report Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts, Zambia Country Report
2011	7/2011	Norad EVAL	Scanteam	Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation to Promote Human Rights Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation to Promote Human Rights Mapping
2011	8/2010	Norad EVAL	Channel Research	Evaluation of Transparency International
2011	8/2011	Norad EVAL	Devfin Advisers AB	Norway's Trade Related Assistance through Multilateral Organizations: A Synthesis Study Report 8/2011 – Study
2011	9/2010	Norad EVAL	Mott MacDonald Limited/HLSP, Beth Plowman, Henry Lucas	Evaluability Study of Partnership Initiatives Norwegian Support to Achieve Millennium Development Goals 4 & 5
2011	n/a	Norad EVAL	Norad	Årsrapport 2010 om evaluering
2011	n/a	Norad EVAL	Norad	Årsrapport 2011: Evaluering av norsk utviklings samarbeid

				Mainstreaming disability in the new development paradigm: Evaluation of Norwegian support to promote the rights of persons with disabilities
				Mainstreaming disability in the new development paradigm: Evaluation of Norwegian support to promote the rights of persons with disabilities, Malawi Country Report
2012	1/2012	Norad EVAL	Nordic Consulting Group	Mainstreaming disability in the new development paradigm: Evaluation of Norwegian support to promote the rights of persons with disabilities, Nepal Country Report
				Mainstreaming disability in the new development paradigm: Evaluation of Norwegian support to promote the rights of persons with disabilities, Palestine Country Report
				Mainstreaming disability in the new development paradigm: Evaluation of Norwegian support to promote the rights of persons with disabilities, Uganda Country Report
2012	10/2011	Norad EVAL	Health Research for Action	Evaluation of Norwegian Health Sector Support to Botswana, Vols 1 & 2
2012	2/2012	Norad EVAL	Tina Søreide, Arne Tostensen and Ingvild Aagedal Skage	Hunting for Per Diem: The Uses and Abuses of Travel Compensation in Three Developing Countries
2012	3/2012	Norad EVAL	ECORYS, IDN	Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with Afghanistan 2001–2011
2012	4/2012	Norad EVAL	HLSP	Evaluation of the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund (HRITF)
2012	5/2012	Norad EVAL	LTS Int., Indufor Oy, Ecometrica & CMI	Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative: Lessons Learned from Support to Civil Society Organisations
2012	9/2011	Norad EVAL	Stefano Migliorisi, Iraj Alikhani, Michel Cramer, Nils Borje Tallroth, Manouchehr Ashouripour, Giorgio di Dio	Activity Based Financial Flows in UN System: a Study of Select UN Organisations, Vols 1 & 2
2013	1/2013	Norad EVAL	Oxford Management	A Framework for Analysing Participation in Development
2013	2/2013	Norad EVAL	Oxford Policy Management	Local Perceptions, Participation and Accountability in Malawi's Health Sector
2013	3/2013	Norad EVAL	Cambridge Economic Policy Associates Ltd.	Evaluation of the Norway–India Partnership Initiative for Maternal and Child Health (including separate annexes)

2013	Norad EVAL	4/2013	Termsfrom Consulting AB, Channel Research & SPRL	Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council and of the Standby Roster NORCAP (including separate annexes)
				Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council and of the Standby Roster: NORCAP Country Report, Pakistan
				Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council and of the Standby Roster: NORCAP Country Report, Somalia
				Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council and of the Standby Roster: NORCAP Country Report, South Sudan
				Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council and of the Standby Roster: NORCAP PETS
2013	Norad EVAL	5/2013	LTS Int., Indufor Oy, Ecometrica & CIMI	Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative Contribution to Measurement, Reporting and Verification (including separate annexes)
2013	Norad EVAL	6/2012	Scanteam	Facing the Resource Curse: Norway's Oil for Development Programme
2013	Norad EVAL	7/2012	Andante	A Study of Monitoring and Evaluation in Six Norwegian Civil Society Organisations
2013	Norad EVAL	8/2012	RAND Europe	Use of Evaluations in the Norwegian Development Cooperation System
2013	Norad EVAL	9/2012	Particip GmbH	Evaluation of Norway's Bilateral Agricultural Support to Food Security
2013	Norad EVAL	n/a	Norad	Evalueringssvdelingens årsrapport 2012: Evaluering av norsk utviklingssamarbeid

Annex 6 List of non-Norad reports

Year	Report number	Commissioned by	Performed by	Title
2007	n/a	DFID	Overseas Development Institute	Parliamentary strengthening in developing countries
2007	n/a	Sida/UNDP	South	Final Evaluation of Sida-Funded Projects on Human Rights and Civic Education
2008	2008:29	Sida	Tom Dahl-Østergaard, Karin Schulz & Barbro Svedberg	Experiences and Lessons Learnt from Sida's Work with Human Rights and Democratic Governance
2010	2010.05	Danida	ITAD & Orbicon A/S	Evaluation of Programmatic Approaches to Support for the Environment in Africa 1996–2009
2011	n/a	DFID	HTSPE Ltd.	Independent Impact Assessment of the Chars Livelihoods Programme – Phase 1
2012	2012.01	Danida	Cosgrave J, Bryld E, and L Jacobsen	Evaluation of the Danish region of Origin Initiative in Afghanistan
2012	00050356	UNDP & GEF	Hernán Reyes G. & Edson Plasencia S.	Final Evaluation Second National Communication on Climate Change in Peru to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
2012	8	DFID	Independent Commission for Aid Impact	Evaluation of DFID's Electoral Support through UNDP
2012	2012:2	Sida	Vera Devine & Rolf Eriksson	Review of the Sida-funded Project Education for Sustainable Development in Action (ESDA)
2012	16	DFID	Independent Commission for Aid Impact	DFID's Education Programmes in Nigeria
2012	2012.06	Danida	ICF GHK	Evaluation of the Access to Justice Programme in Zambia, 2006–11
2013	n/a	World Bank	Independent Evaluation Group; World Bank	Afghanistan Country Program Evaluation, 2002–11
2013	2013.1	Danida	Intrac, TANA & Indevelop	Evaluation of Danish Support to Civil Society
2013	2013:30	Sida	Ulrika Ribohn	Human rights for persons with disabilities; an evaluation of the work plan
2013	n/a	UNDP	Arthur Byabagambi	End of the Programme Evaluation 'UNDP Support to Inclusive Participation in Governance' (IPG) Programme
2013	2014:2:I	Sida	Erik Bryld, Ian Christoplos, Dina Sinigallia, Palwasha Hassan & Saboor Kamraan	Evaluation of Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)
2013	2014:5	Sida	Kevin Kelpin, Henrik Alffram with Ian Christoplos & Jessica Rothman	Evaluation of Sida's Core Support to the Euro-Burma Office (EBO) – Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy in the Union Burma/Myanmar
2009	EV703	DFID	Paul Thornton, Dane Rogers, Chan Sophal & Chris Vickery	Evaluation of DFID Country Programmes – Cambodia

Annex 7 Terms of Reference

Unintended effects of aid in evaluations of Norwegian aid A literature study

Introduction

Research has documented different types of unintended effects from development aid. Do evaluations of Norwegian development aid document corresponding findings regarding unintended effects? With this literature study, we want to find out to what extent unintended effects are identified in aid evaluations, what we can learn from the findings, and which consequences this should have for the aid management system.

Unintended effects of aid may be thought of as negative effects, but there may also be positive effects of aid that were not originally foreseen. Whether effects are «positive» or «negative» may also in some cases depend on the interests and the point of view of those who assess the effects¹.

Unintended effects are accounted for, in principle, both in aid management systems and in evaluations. For instance, the OECD DACs definition of risk analysis states:

"An analysis or an assessment of factors (called assumptions in the log frame) that affect or are likely to affect the successful achievement of an intervention's objectives. A detailed examination of the potential unwanted and negative consequences to human life, health, property, or the environment posed by development interventions; a systematic process to provide information regarding such undesirable consequences; the process of quantification of the probabilities and expected impacts for identified risks." (OECD 2002:34)²

Unintended effects are also accounted for in one of the five evaluation criteria of OECD DAC, where «impact» is defined as:

"The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. This involves the main impacts and effects resulting from the activity on the local social, economic, environmental and other development indicators. The examination should be concerned with both intended and unintended results and must also include the positive and negative impact of external factors, such as changes in terms of trade and financial conditions."³

1 See Ferguson (1994) The Anti-Politics Machine: «Development», Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho.

2 OECD (2002) «Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management». OECD DAC working party on aid evaluation

3 <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

Unintended effects are systematically taken into account in some categories of aid, most notably in aid where there are particular risks relating to health, social and environmental issues, in conflict areas, and in consideration of corruption risks in aid. Such issues are addressed in manuals, safeguards or guidelines and often denominated as risk analysis. However, in other aid there is less systematic consideration of unintended effects. Risk analyses in aid management may emphasis only the first sentence referred to above – on external factors that may affect the success of the intervention – and not always the second – on risks that the intervention itself may affect external factors in unintended ways. In this study, we are primarily, but not exclusively, interested in unintended effects that are not routinely covered by systematic risk analysis, but are potentially relevant to all aid regardless of type.

Possible ways of approaching unintended effects

Unintended effects of aid that have been identified by research can be categorized in different ways. We briefly present two different ways of categorizing unintended effects of aid. The literature study need not necessarily be limited to this way of categorizing.

Unintended effects at the macro-level

Research on development issues show how aid may have unintended effects on the macro-level, and the most commonly discussed phenomena are the «Dutch disease», the fungibility effect, and the distortion of democratic accountability.

The two first effects concern a country's economic development, such as the GDP and economic growth. One concern has been macroeconomic implications of aid, such as the «Dutch disease». The concept usually denominates a phenomenon where a country's revenues increase fast, usually due to exploitation of natural resources, and where this increased revenue leads to a raise in the real exchange rate, which again negatively affects the manufacturing sector of the country. A question is therefore whether foreign aid can have the same effect on a country's economy. Studies of different development countries give mixed evidence regarding symptoms of the Dutch disease after receiving large amount of foreign aid (Newby 2010)⁴.

Recent studies indicate a positive correlation between aid and growth (Arndt et al 2010), but several studies indicate that the relationship between aid and economic growth varies between different contexts. Since many aid projects do not have economic growth as a main objective, there is also the question whether growth can be a positive, yet unintended, effect of aid?

4 Newby, T.M.J. (2010) «Unintended Effects of development Aid». DIIS Working Paper 2010:06. Danish Institute for International Studies.

Sumner and Mallett (2013) find that aid can have positive effects on growth and welfare outcomes, and that this is more likely under certain conducive conditions, such as increasing growth and good policies. In these situations, aid may be said to have a catalytic effect on economic growth.

The fungibility effect is a concern that development aid granted to a welfare sector may not in effect increase spending in that sector but instead allow government to move resources to other sectors, such as the military⁵. Various research suggests a relative insecurity as to whether aid is fungible or not (Newby 2010), or conversely, whether aid is catalytic or not. A more relevant question for this study is: in which situations will aid interventions work catalytically rather than being subject to fungibility?

Another macro-level effect of foreign aid may be a distortion of democratic accountability. For example, governments may be more accountable towards donors than their own citizens, with the effects that donors' expectations are met before governments' own priorities (Moss et al 2006)⁶. Moss et al (2006) suggest that aid may reduce states' incentives for taxation, and that governments who receive their revenues externally rather than from their own population, feel less pressure to maintain popular legitimacy. In addition, aid may create a huge administrative burden for government administration, foster corruption etc.

Unintended effects on the micro-level

There are various examples of unintended effects of aid interventions on the micro-level, more or less systematically addressed in research. One example is microfinance programs that fail and only have the effect of leaving poor people with a larger debt than before. Another example is how per diem systems may create an incentive structure that encourages key staff members to attend workshops rather than fulfill their ordinary work responsibilities⁷. This may again weaken the effectiveness of the state administration and other important institutions. Also, aid often creates a great administrative burden on recipient institutions, particularly since donors demand different sets of reporting and accounts.

«Brain drain» is another common example of an unintended effect of aid, where the public sector has trouble recruiting the necessary expertise because skilled personnel would rather take better-paid employment with international aid agencies.

Aid to improve Guatemala's taxation system provides a positive example of an unintended effect of a development intervention, where the introduction of an on-line filing system in the Central Bank also had the effect of increasing computer literacy among the public servants to 95%⁸.

5 See Collier P. and A. Hoeffler (2007) «Unintended consequences: Does Aid Promotes Arms Races?» Oxford Bulletin of Economics and statistics, 69, 1

6 Moss, T. G. Pettersson and N. van de Walle (2006) «An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa» Working Paper Number 74, Center for Global Development.

7 See Norad 2/2012 *Hunting for per diem*.

8 See pp 94, OECD 2013 *Tax and Development*

Effects of aid on the micro-level is studied through mixed methods, but dominated by ethnographic methods, scrutinizing an intervention's effect on its surroundings. Several of these studies analyse how development aid projects benefit certain groups over others in the community (Newby 2010). It thus may be more relevant to ask for whom a given project is a success or a failure?

Possible sources of unintended effects

The description of unintended consequences above is categorized according to a macro- and micro-level. Another way of categorizing and understanding unintended consequences may be drawn from the sociologist Merton⁹.

First, he distinguishes between what is purposive action and not. He underlines the complexity of the assumption of rationality in human behavior, that persons always choose the objectively most rational action to achieve their objectives. Determining the definite purposes of a specific action is thus methodologically complicated.

Secondly, Merton classifies unintended consequences of action according to their different sources. The following are Merton's sources of unintended consequences:

- **Ignorance**
There will often be aspects about the situation in which we operate that we are ignorant about, and that may influence the effect of the action.
- **Error**
For example, aid actors may err in their assumptions about whether a successful intervention in one situation will be successful in a different location and situation.
- **Imperious immediacy of interest**
This aspect refers to where an actor is so concerned about the immediate effects of the action or the intervention, that other effects are not considered.
- **Basic values**
When actors are more concerned with performing actions that correspond to their basic values, than considering the objective consequences of their actions.
- **Self-defeating prediction**
This may be the opposite of a so-called «self-fulfilling prophecy», and describes the fact that predictions of social development often itself become an element in that very field and thereby contribute to change it.

Merton's way of understanding sources of unintended consequences may be useful as inspiration to a process of developing a clearer understanding of unintended effects of aid.

⁹ See Merton (1936) «The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action» *American Sociological Review*, Volume 1, Issue 6, pp 894-904.

Purpose and objectives

The purpose of the literature study is to suggest ways to improve the management of Norwegian aid with regard to the way unintended consequences of aid are addressed, handled, mitigated and evaluated.

The objective is to gather insights from previous evaluations with regards to unintended consequences of Norwegian aid, and produce a systematic overview of findings from already conducted evaluations related to unintended effects. It is assumed that this will stimulate further discussions as well as to provide knowledge that can be used to improve the systematic addressing of the issue in aid management.

More specifically, the study will identify unintended effects of Norwegian aid, categorize them into different types, and discuss the different types of unintended effects with regard to whether they are amenable or in which other ways they could be addressed, and whether there are some types that should be paid more attention to in aid management. The approaches used in this Terms of Reference is only possible approaches to classifying unintended effects, and the researchers are encouraged to suggest and include other ways if appropriate.

Methodology

This study shall examine all evaluation reports produced by Norad's evaluation department in the period 2010-2013. It shall collect and compile findings concerning both positive and negative unintended consequences of aid identified in these reports.

The study should also include a sample of other relevant evaluations. In principle this includes all relevant evaluations of both bilateral and multilateral aid in countries and sectors where Norwegian aid also contributes. The consultants are expected to suggest a sample of evaluations to include in the study, to be agreed upon in a dialogue with Norad (see time schedule).

The consultants should also include insights from relevant research literature in the discussion.

Evaluation questions

The Literature study should include, but is not limited to, the following questions:

- What types of unintended effects of aid have been documented in the evaluations of Norwegian aid?
- To which extent do the evaluations of Norwegian aid identify both positive and negative unintended consequences? When such has been identified, is this as a response to specific requirements in the Terms of References of the evaluations, or does it seem to be something that the evaluators have done on their own initiative?
- Which types of unintended effects can be relatively easily predicted, and which are particularly difficult to predict?
- Which negative effects can be regarded as avoidable, or conversely, as inherently unavoidable?
- How can the different unintended effects be mitigated in a more systematic manner in the management of aid?

Time frame and deliverables

The synthesis evaluation end report shall be written in a clear, accessible language, and include an executive summary, recommendations, and annexes listing the evaluations that are included in the literature study. The end report should not exceed 15 pages excluding annexes.

The researcher(s) are also expected to participate in a dissemination seminar, and include time for this within the set time frame.

Time schedule:

January 2013: Bidding and contract

Medio February 2014: Discussion on scope of the review and the way forward between Norad and consultant(s).

Medio March 2014: Draft report

End of March 2014: Final report

Budget: Maximum 270 consultant hours

EVALUATION REPORTS

- 7.00 Evaluation of the Norwegian Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety Priorities, Organisation, Implementation
- 8.00 Evaluation of the Norwegian Mixed Credits Programme
- 9.00 "Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?" Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway's Political Past in the Middle East
- 10.00 Taken for Granted? An Evaluation of Norway's Special Grant for the Environment
- 1.01 Evaluation of the Norwegian Human Rights Fund
- 2.01 Economic Impacts on the Least Developed Countries of the Elimination of Import Tariffs on their Products
- 3.01 Evaluation of the Public Support to the Norwegian NGOs Working in Nicaragua 1994–1999
- 3A.01 Evaluación del Apoyo Público a las ONGs Noruegas que Trabajan en Nicaragua 1994–1999
- 4.01 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Cooperation on Poverty Reduction
- 5.01 Evaluation of Development Co-operation between Bangladesh and Norway, 1995–2000
- 6.01 Can democratisation prevent conflicts? Lessons from sub-Saharan Africa
- 7.01 Reconciliation Among Young People in the Balkans An Evaluation of the Post Pessimist Network
- 1.02 Evaluation of the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM)
- 2.02 Evaluation of the International Humanitarian Assistance of the Norwegian Red Cross
- 3.02 Evaluation of ACOPAMAN ILO program for "Cooperative and Organizational Support to Grassroots Initiatives" in Western Africa 1978 – 1999
- 3A.02 Évaluation du programme ACOPAMUn programme du BIT sur l'« Appui associatif et coopératif aux initiatives de Développement à la Base » en Afrique de l'Ouest de 1978 à 1999
- 4.02 Legal Aid Against the Odds Evaluation of the Civil Rights Project (CRP) of the Norwegian Refugee Council in former Yugoslavia
- 1.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund)
- 2.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Education Trust Fund for African the World Bank
- 3.03 Evaluering av Bistandsstorgets Evalueringsnettverk
- 1.04 Towards Strategic Framework for Peace-building: Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of the Peacebuilding.
- 2.04 Norwegian Peace-building policies: Lessons Learnt and Challenges Ahead
- 3.04 Evaluation of CESAR's activities in the Middle East Funded by Norway
- 4.04 Evaluering av ordningen med støtte gjennom paraplyorganisasjoner. Eksempifisert ved støtte til Norsk Misjons Bistandsnemda og Atlas-alliansen
- 5.04 Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka: Building Civil Society
- 6.04 Study of the impact of the work of Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society
- 1.05 –Study: Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka and Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society
- 1.05 –Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norad Fellowship Programme
- 2.05 –Evaluation: Women Can Do It – an evaluation of the WCDI programme in the Western Balkans
- 3.05 Gender and Development – a review of evaluation report 1997–2004
- 4.05 Evaluation of the Framework Agreement between the Government of Norway and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
- 5.05 Evaluation of the "Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation (1997–2005)"
- 1.06 Inter-Ministerial Cooperation. An Effective Model for Capacity Development?
- 2.06 Evaluation of Fredskorpset
- 1.06 – Synthesis Report: Lessons from Evaluations of Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation
- 1.07 Evaluation of the Norwegian Petroleum-Related Assistance
- 1.07 – Synteserapport: Humanitær innsats ved naturkatastrofer: En syntese av evalueringsfunn
- 1.07 – Study: The Norwegian International Effort against Female Genital Mutilation
- 2.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Power-related Assistance
- 2.07 – Study Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in South America
- 3.07 Evaluation of the Effects of the using M-621 Cargo Trucks in Humanitarian Transport Operations
- 4.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Development Support to Zambia (1991 - 2005)
- 5.07 Evaluation of the Development Cooperation to Norwegian NGOs in Guatemala
- 1.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS)
- 1.08 Study: The challenge of Assessing Aid Impact: A review of Norwegian Evaluation Practise
- 1.08 Synthesis Study: On Best Practise and Innovative Approaches to Capacity Development in Low Income African Countries
- 2.08 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD)
- 2.08 Synthesis Study: Cash Transfers Contributing to Social Protection: A Synthesis of Evaluation Findings
- 2.08 Study: Anti-Corruption Approaches. A Literature Review
- 3.08 Evaluation: Mid-term Evaluation the EEA Grants
- 4.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian HIV/AIDS Responses
- 5.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Research and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building
- 6.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation in the Fisheries Sector
- 1.09 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of Nepal's Education for All 2004-2009 Sector Programme
- 1.09 Study Report: Global Aid Architecture and the Health Millennium Development Goals
- 2.09 Evaluation: Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan
- 2.09 Study Report: A synthesis of Evaluations of Environment Assistance by Multilateral Organisations
- 3.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation through Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations in Northern Uganda (2003-2007)
- 3.09 Study Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Sri Lanka Case Study
- 4.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to the Protection of Cultural Heritage
- 4.09 Study Report: Norwegian Environmental Action Plan
- 5.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Peacebuilding in Haiti 1998–2008
- 6.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Humanitarian Mine Action Activities of Norwegian People's Aid
- 7.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Programme for Development, Research and Education (NUFU) and of Norad's Programme for Master Studies (NOMA)
- 1.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support 2002–2009
- 2.10 Synthesis Study: Support to Legislatures
- 3.10 Synthesis Main Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance
- 4.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance South Africa Case Study
- 5.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Bangladesh Case Study
- 6.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Uganda Case Study
- 7.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with the Western Balkans
- 8.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of Transparency International
- 9.10 Study: Evaluability Study of Partnership Initiatives
- 10.10 Evaluation: Democracy Support through the United Nations
- 11.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the International Organization for Migration and its Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking
- 12.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI)
- 13.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Brasil
- 14.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Democratic Republic of Congo
- 15.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Guyana
- 16.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Indonesia
- 17.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Tanzania
- 18.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative
- 1.11 Evaluation: Results of Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGO's in East Africa
- 2.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of Research on Norwegian Development Assistance
- 3.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Strategy for Norway's Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South
- 4.11 Study: Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption: Lessons Learned
- 5.11 Pawns of Peace. Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
- 6.11 Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts, 2002-2009
- 7.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation to Promote Human Rights
- 8.11 Norway's Trade Related Assistance through Multilateral Organizations: A Synthesis Study
- 9.11 Activity-Based Financial Flows in UN System: A study of Select UN Organisations Volume 1 Synthesis Volume 2 Case Studies
- 10.11 Evaluation of Norwegian Health Sector Support to Botswana
- 1.12 Mainstreaming disability in the new development paradigm. Evaluation of Norwegian support to promote the rights of persons with disabilities.
- 2.12 Hunting for Per Diem. The uses and Abuses of Travel Compensation in Three Developing Countries
- 3.12 Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with Afghanistan 2001-2011
- 4.12 Evaluation of the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund
- 5.12 Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Lessons Learned from Support to Civil Society Organisations.
- 6.12 Facing the Resource Curse: Norway's Oil for Development Program A Study of Monitoring and Evaluation in Six Norwegian Civil Society Organisations
- 7.12 Use of Evaluations in the Norwegian Development Cooperation System
- 8.12 Use of Evaluations in the Norwegian Development Cooperation System
- 9.12 Evaluation of Norway's Bilateral Agricultural Support to Food Security
- 1.13 A Framework for Analysing Participation in Development
- 2.13 Local Perceptions, Participation and Accountability in Malawi's Health Sector
- 3.13 Evaluation of the Norwegian India Partnership Initiative
- 4.13 Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and of the Standby Rpster NORCAP
- 5.13 Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative Contribution to Measurement, Reporting and Verification
- 1.14 Can We Demonstrate the Difference that Norwegian Aid Makes? Evaluation of results measurement and how this can be improved

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